6. Against Belief Normativity

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Introduction

We have argued against the thesis that content is essentially normative (Glüer & Wikforss 2009a). In the course of doing so, we also presented some considerations against the thesis that belief is essentially normative. In this paper we would like to clarify and develop these considerations, thereby paving the road for a fully non-normative account of the nature of belief.

Belief is a mental state representing the world as being a certain way. In this sense, it should be uncontroversial to say that belief is a propositional attitude. But which propositional attitude? A first shot at characterizing the attitude of belief more often than not takes a somewhat metaphorical character: Beliefs have mind-to-world ‘direction of fit’. They ‘aim at truth’. They are ‘committal’. Traditionally, the ideas behind these metaphors were supposed to be captured by saying that belief is the attitude of holding true. Recently, however, it has been suggested that this actually tells us very little. More precisely, characterizing belief in terms of truth-directedness is too unspecific. There are other attitudes that are, in some sense, truth-directed; examples are cognitive attitudes clearly different from belief such as imagining or assuming.¹

The question therefore arises whether a more specific characterization can be given, one that distinguishes belief from all the other cognitive attitudes. Normativism about belief is an answer to this question: According to the belief normativist, what distinguishes belief from attitudes such as imagining or assuming is its normative nature. Attempts to give a purely descriptive account of belief are bound to fail, it is

argued, since they leave out the *oughts* that are essential to belief: Necessarily, nothing not subject to certain norms is a belief.²

In the debate, the normativity in question is standardly construed as *prescriptive* in nature, and this is how we shall construe it, too. So, here are the basics of the package we are concerned with: There are norms, genuine *oughts*, governing or *guiding* any believer’s belief formation. Failing to form a belief in accordance with such a norm is incorrect in the strong sense of violating the norm. Moreover, that belief formation is rule governed in this sense is *essential* to belief. This is often put in terms of constitutivity: It is *constitutive* of belief that it is governed by norms. The notion of constitutivity is notoriously unclear, but nothing here will hang on it. For our purposes, neither essentiality nor constitutivity need amount to more than metaphysical necessity.³

It should be stressed at the outset, that the content normativity thesis and the belief normativity thesis are distinct. Belief normativism is a thesis about the nature of the psychological *state*, content normativism is a thesis about the nature of the *content* not only of belief, but all the propositional attitudes. It is possible to endorse belief normativism without endorsing content normativism, and vice versa. Indeed, many people who reject content normativism accept belief normativism. The question of whether belief is essentially normative is therefore of interest quite independently of whether content is normative.

Nevertheless, the two lines of argument commonly employed in support of belief normativism are quite parallel to those used in support of content normativism. The first line of argument draws on the idea that there is an essential connection


³ According to some normativists the relevant notion of necessity is that of *conceptual* necessity (see for instance Boghossian (2003), Jackson (2000), and Shah (2003)). In what follows we shall also assume that conceptual necessity entails metaphysical necessity. This assumption is not completely uncontroversial, but it should be harmless in this context since it is embraced by those belief normativists that construe belief normativism as a conceptual truth. After all, they aim at making claims about the nature of belief, not about the *concept* of belief.
between belief and truth, such that belief is that state which is governed by (some version of) the ‘truth norm’:

\[(N_1) \quad \text{One ought to believe that } p \text{ if and only if } p.\]

A second line of argument focuses on the connection between belief and rationality. On this view, it is constitutive of belief to be governed by the ‘rules’ of rationality. These are usually equated with epistemic rules, more precisely, the ‘rules’ of valid inference, be it logical or ‘material’. In contrast to the objective ought of truth, the ought here is a subjective ought, directly engaging with the subject's perspective. Candidate norms would for instance be:

\[(N_2) \quad \text{One ought to believe that } p \text{ if and only if one has sufficient evidence that } p.\]

\[(N_3) \quad \text{If one believes that } p \text{ and believes that if } p \text{ then } q, \text{ then one ought to believe that } q.\]

The paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 discusses the argument from truth, section 2 the idea that truth guides ‘indirectly’, section 3 the claim that rationality is essentially normative, and section 4 the very idea that belief formation is essentially rule-guided. All the troubles we shall raise ultimately stem from the same source: Very intuitive ideas about rule guidance. It is part and parcel of belief normativism as put forward in the debate that the rules or norms in question are genuine prescriptions capable of guiding belief formation. We shall argue that this is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. The rule must make a difference, so to speak, a difference both to the formation and, consequently, to the explanation of rule-guided belief. A rule-guided belief is a belief that, in a sense to be further specified, has been formed because of the rule. Belief normativism, we shall argue, cannot account for this difference in what we take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. This leaves open the possibility of accounting for it in other terms. It also leaves open the
possibility of adopting a quietist attitude to the distinction between being guided by a rule and mere regularities. In both cases, the normativist will have to motivate the departure from intuition, and make it plausible that we are indeed dealing with genuine rule-guidance. Lastly, the normativist could abandon guidance – and thereby genuine prescriptivity – in favor of some other, novel construal of normativity. Since we are only concerned with genuine prescriptivity, that would amount to accepting the conclusion of this paper.

1. The objective ought: The no-guidance argument

The suggestion that belief is governed by a truth norm such as (N1) derives from the idea that it is essential to belief that it ‘aims at truth’. This, it is argued, needs to be understood in normative terms: A false belief is not merely a truth-directed mental state the content of which is false but a state the formation of which violates a norm. This distinguishes believing that p from assuming that p or imagining that p, since one can assume or imagine what is false without thereby violating any norm. Paul Boghossian, for instance, puts it: “The truth is what you ought to believe, whether or not you know how to go about it, and whether or not you know if you have attained it. That, in my view, is what makes it the state that it is” (2003: 39).

Now, there has been quite some debate concerning how precisely to formulate the truth norm. As it stands, (N1) is problematic since it seems to violate the maxim ‘ought implies can’: It follows that we ought to believe everything that is true, something which is not possible given the infinite number of truths that there are. For this reason, it has been suggested that (N1) be replaced by the weaker (N1*):

(N1*) One ought to believe that p only if p.4

This avoids the problem, but also leaves the truth norm seriously weakened since it fails to provide any real constraints on the subject's belief formation: It no longer follows that if p is true S ought to believe that p or, even, that if p is false S ought not
to believe that \( p \) (cf. Bykvist & Hattiangadi (2007)). Several attempts have been made to overcome the difficulty.\(^5\) It has been suggested that \( (N_1) \) can be made plausible if it is restricted to apply to beliefs that one considers (cf. Wedgwood (2002)). Another proposal is that \( (N_1) \) should not be spelled out in terms of \textit{oughts} but in terms of permissions, so that the truth norm simply tells us that we \textit{may} believe \( p \) if and only if \( p \) is true – a norm that is violated by false belief (Whiting 2010).\(^6\)

The question concerning the precise formulation of the truth norm is no doubt interesting and the debate is bound to continue. In our 2009 paper, however, we suggested that there is a more fundamental difficulty concerning the idea that truth norms can serve to guide belief formation. This argument we have later called the ‘no-guidance argument’ (2010b). It concludes that no truth norm can make any difference to belief formation. Consequently, it is at odds with the very basics of any intuitive idea of rule-guidance.

The argument starts from the observation that \( (N_1) \) is conditional in form: It tells the subject to ‘do something’ under certain conditions \( C \). In order to follow, or be guided by, any such conditional prescription, the subject needs to have some belief as to whether these conditions are fulfilled. Take the rule ‘buy low, sell high’. In order to know what to do – buy or sell – the subject needs to form a belief about the market.\(^7\) The same holds for \( (N_1) \): To be guided by \( (N_1) \), the subject needs to form a belief about whether the condition it puts on the \textit{ought} is fulfilled. But in this case that amounts to having to form a belief as to whether \( p \) is true. In order to know what to do, whether to believe that \( p \), that is, the subject needs to determine whether \( p \). This, we have argued, makes it intuitively very strange to think of \( (N_1) \) as guiding belief formation.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) See Bykvist & Hattiangadi (forthcoming) for a response to some such attempts.

\(^6\) In addition, it has been questioned whether the 'ought implies can' principle is always correct (Engel 2007). This, of course, is a principle that belief normativists have trouble with in any case, since normativism sits uneasily with the observation that we cannot believe at will, i.e. that doxastic voluntarism is false (see Alston (1985)). In what follows we shall leave the problem of doxastic voluntarism aside however, and argue that even if this problem can be overcome belief normativism is in trouble.

\(^7\) This belief does not have to be correct, of course – you can be guided by a rule in what you do and nevertheless (though inadvertently) end up doing the wrong thing.

\(^8\) The problem is not, as Steglich-Petersen in a reply to our original paper suggests, that “what the norm prescribes is the very same as what is already the case if the antecedent condition
There are, as we spell out in some detail in our (2010b), two related reasons for this strangeness: First, the norm cannot influence belief formation, since in order to be guided by \((N_1)\) one already had to form a belief as to whether \(p\). The very question we wanted guidance on – whether to believe that \(p\) – needs to have been answered before any such guidance can be received. Thus, \((N_1)\) always comes ‘too late’, as it were, to do the guiding work it is supposed to do. Second, \((N_1)\) never makes a difference in the following sense, either: It never ‘tells me’, or ‘provides me with a reason’ to believe anything other than what I have come to believe anyway. That is, if I believe that \(p\) then \((N_1)\) ‘gives me a reason’ to believe that \(p\), and if I believe that \(\neg p\) it ‘gives me a reason’ to believe \(\neg p\). As we put it in our original paper, not much guidance is to be had from such a norm.

We would like to emphasize again here that these difficulties arise independently of which formulation of the truth norm one favors: Neither \((N_1\ast)\) nor replacing ‘ought’ with ‘may’ helps solving this problem. Moreover, the difficulty is specific to the truth norm – it does not turn on there being a general problem with objective norms. There is no general no-guidance problem for objective norms such as ‘Buy low and sell high’ or ‘One ought to always promote the maximum happiness’. Naturally, such norms can serve to motivate action only in conjunction with certain beliefs on the part of the agent, but in these cases this fact does not pose any difficulties: I believe that the market is at a low and hence the rule provides me with a reason to buy; I believe that action \(A\) would promote maximum happiness and hence the rule provides me with a reason to do \(A\). The trouble with the truth norm is specific to this norm, and derives precisely from the combination of being a norm for belief with putting specifically this condition on its ought: \(p\) being true.\(^9\)

\footnote{This, also, is why it does not matter to our argument which of the suggested versions of the truth norm one picks: on all of them the relevant condition will be the truth of \(p\).}
The no-guidance argument concludes that the truth norm – be it in the form of (N₁) or any of the others – cannot play the role of a norm guiding our belief formation. Hence, belief normativism cannot be supported by appealing to the connection between belief and truth. Of course, none of this is to deny that there is an important connection between belief and truth. Most obviously, beliefs essentially have truth-evaluable contents. And even a stronger claim seems quite plausible: Belief arguably is the only propositional attitude taking as its conditions of correctness those of its content. Thus, we do not merely say that the content of a belief is false, but that the belief is: S has a false belief iff S believes that p, and p is false. By contrast, we do not say that imagining that p is false simply because p is. And analogously for assuming that p. It might even be proposed, although we shall not pursue this suggestion here, that this is the wanted further characteristic distinguishing belief from other truth-directed attitudes. But even if one can thus speak of the correctness conditions of belief this does not entail that there are any oughts involved. And the upshot of the no-guidance argument is precisely that the essential connection between belief and truth cannot be construed as one involving norms capable of guiding belief formation – at least not if guidance is understood in anything like the intuitive sense.

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10 Cf. Wedgwood (2009: 158). Unlike Wedgwood, however, we do not think that this observation supports normativism.
11 A proposal along these lines can be found in Dretske (2000). Arguing against belief normativism, Dretske suggests that the fact that being true or false is essential to beliefs suffices to distinguish them from “other mental states like wishes, desires, hopes, doubts and pains” (2000: 248).
12 For more on this, see Glüer & Wikforss (2009a: 36). See also below, section 3.
13 Pascal Engel has suggested that the guidance problem can be solved once we distinguish between “the statement of the norm” and “how the norm is regulated (its regulation)” (2007: 189; forthcoming). Simply stating the norm, he argues, “does not tell us how it is implemented in a believer's psychology”, but it would be wrong to conclude that the principle does not regulate since “there must be some relation between the principle and the regulation”. This is so, he argues, since people can be criticized for having false beliefs. However, it is hard to see what Engel's argument is. Of course, the norm is one thing, its psychological role another (although Engel's talk about the regulation of the norm is hard to decipher – norms regulate but are they themselves regulated?). Our point is simply that (N₁) cannot be a guiding norm, i.e. it cannot play a certain role in the agent's psychology. This claim cannot be rejected simply by asserting that (N₁) must play such a role. And, of course, one can be criticized for other things than violating prescriptions.
2. Deriving subjective oughts from objective ‘aims’

It is commonly assumed that the difficulty raised in the previous section can easily be overcome. Even if truth cannot guide belief formation directly, it is held, truth guides indirectly, via the so-called subjective norms of rationality, the ‘rules’ of logic and evidence. Moreover, it is suggested, it is precisely because the objective ought of truth holds of belief that the subjective oughts hold as well. Thus, it is essential to belief that it is guided not only by (N₁) but also by norms of the kind (N₂) and (N₃) are instances of. Boghossian, for instance, argues that it is because belief is governed by the truth norm that the less controversial subjective oughts hold as well: “All of these familiar epistemic norms are grounded in the objective norm of truth. It is that ought that supplies their rationale, even if it has proven extremely difficult to say – in the theory of knowledge – exactly how” (2003: 39).

The question is how we are to understand the notion of ‘indirect guidance’. What exactly is the relation between the norm of truth and the norms of rationality? A radical proposal is that the objective ought can simply be reduced to the subjective one. This is the line defended by Alan Gibbard (2005). According to Gibbard, the subjective ought is analytically prior, in fact primitive, and the objective ought can be defined in terms of it: What one objectively ought to do is what one subjectively ought to do if one had full information. Applied to the epistemic case, this means that what I objectively ought to believe is what I subjectively ought to believe in the

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14 Indeed, Shah & Velleman (2005) raise a worry related to our no-guidance argument, and conclude that what follows is merely that truth cannot guide directly. They focus on a specific form of doxastic deliberation where the subject deliberates whether to believe that p. The conclusions reached by such deliberation are a specific kind of ‘meta-belief’: Beliefs as to whether one should believe that p. One cannot engage in such deliberation, Shah & Velleman suggest, unless one accepts that the truth norm applies to the state in question: Deliberating whether to believe p necessarily involves deliberating whether p is true. They then consider the objection that since determining whether p is true requires arriving at a belief with respect to p, they are committed to saying that doxastic deliberation involves a practical syllogism moving from the premises ‘I will believe that p if and only if p is true’ and ‘p is true’ to the conclusion ‘I will believe that p’. Such a syllogism already involves the judgment that p is true as its minor premise, and, as they put it, “believing that p cannot be an intermediate step in deliberating whether to believe that p” (2005: 520). The proper conclusion, they suggest, is not that there is something wrong with the truth norm but that “doxastic deliberation cannot aim at truth directly” (ibid). Instead of aiming at accepting p only if p is true, one should aim at following some truth-conducive methods. For instance, if one judges that there is sufficient evidence that p then one should be moved to believe that p.
epistemically ideal situation of full information. Hence, Gibbard argues, even though the truth norm cannot guide directly “truth is the condition of correct belief” (2005: 349).

Whether or not Gibbard's recipe for reduction succeeds in the case of moral oughts, it is clear that it is problematic in the epistemic case. The claim that S objectively ought to believe that p iff S subjectively ought to believe that p where S has full information is either trivially true or, it would seem, simply false. It is trivially true if ‘full information’ includes p. But if p is not included, the claim seems false: Intuitively, there are scenarios where S has all the available evidence and believes what she subjectively ought to believe – i.e. on the basis of this evidence – and yet the belief in question is false. There is therefore little hope of reducing the objective norm of truth to the subjective norms of rationality.

Perhaps a weaker relation will do? A common idea is that even if the objective ought cannot be reduced to the subjective one, there is an important means-end relation between the rules of rationality and truth, such that if one aims at truth one ought to follow the rules of rationality. This appears to be what Shah & Velleman have in mind when suggesting that the solution to the problem concerning guidance and truth consists in recognizing that in order to aim at truth one must aim at following some truth-conducive method (2005: 520). It is also suggested by Boghossian's claim that the objective ought provides a ‘rationale’ for the subjective ought, and Ralph Wedgwood explicitly defends the idea that the norms of rationality stand in a means-end relation to the truth norm.

According to Wedgwood the norm of truth is the most fundamental norm of belief since it explains all other epistemic norms governing belief. The explanation is supposed to run as follows: Essential to belief is the aim of truth, but, in general, to achieve one's aims one has to do something, one has to use certain means, and the

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15 It is, however, not completely easy to spell out what such scenarios are like. One might be tempted to say that evil demon scenarios are extreme scenarios of this sort. But unless one has very strong internalist intuitions about evidence and evidential relations, these might actually rather be cases where there is no rational way of forming (empirical) beliefs on the basis of evidence – as there is no such thing as evidence here. Still, as long as there are (empirical) truths in such a scenario, evil demon scenarios do provide counterexamples to Gibbard’s reduction claim. (See also fn. 31 below.)
only way to achieve the aim of truth is by revising one's beliefs “by means of following certain rules” (2002: 276; 2007: 154). Following these rules thus is required to achieve the aim essential to belief. Consequently, Wedgwood suggests, being regulated by these rules is essential to belief as well.

Which, then, are these rules? Wedgwood proposes that they are the rules that it is rational to believe are reliably error-avoiding in the circumstances (2002: 277). This captures the idea, Wedgwood suggests, that the standards of rational belief are ‘oriented’ towards the goal of having correct (i.e. true) beliefs: a belief is rational, in relation to a body of information, just in case that body of information “makes it highly likely that the belief in question is correct” (2007: 156).

In effect, that is, Wedgwood proposes that the rules of rationality provide the necessary means to the end of truth. His belief normativism thus is a combination of the following three elements: (i) The rules of rationality are capable of guiding belief formation, (ii) these rules are essential to belief, and (iii) their essentiality derives from truth’s being the aim of belief. For the sake of argument we shall not here question (i) (we will return to the issue of guidance in sections 3 and 4 below). Instead, we shall argue that (ii) and (iii) cannot be coherently combined (at least not in the way Wedgwood suggests): If truth is the aim of belief, the rules of rationality are not essential to belief. And if the rules of rationality are essential to belief, truth is not its aim. There is a dilemma here.

Let’s start with the first horn of the dilemma: If truth is the aim of belief, the rules of rationality are not essential to belief. We shall assume that ‘the rules of rationality’ is a rigid definite description: It designates the same set of rules in all possible worlds. We take it that this captures what the normativist has in mind: That there are particular rules that are both capable of guiding and essential to belief. Wedgwood certainly seems to think so when he characterizes these as the rules it is rational to believe are reliable means towards the end of truth, and insists that no matter what the world is like it is always rational to believe that the rules of rationality
are reliable. But this characterization amounts to a substantial weakening of the required relation between the rules of rationality and the end of truth. Why would Wedgwood want to settle for this? Precisely to avoid the first horn of our dilemma.

To see this, assume that the rules of rationality are the same in all possible worlds, and that we require that the rules guiding belief are such that following them is a reliable means to truth. There clearly are worlds in which following the rules of rationality is not a reliable means to truth – at least with respect to empirical truth. Indeed, in some worlds the most reliable means to the end of empirical truth might be to believe just what one wants to be true. Consequently, which rules we should follow in our pursuit of empirical truth would vary from one possible world to another. In some worlds, it’s the rules of rationality, but by no means in all. Such contingency clearly is in tension with the claim that the rules of rationality are essential to belief. Their essentiality to belief therefore cannot be derived from their providing reliable means to the end of truth.

Moreover, what the proper means to empirical truth are depends precisely on contingent matters. It is in general, independently of whether rule-following is involved or not, contingent which ‘mechanisms’ for forming empirical beliefs are reliable, or reliably error-avoiding. But for following rules in particular this means that the rules in question not only vary from world to world but are bound to be purely instrumental rules. On the assumption that the rules of rationality actually are truth conducive the normative force derivable from the aim of truth would be no different.

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16 For instance, he says that even if you are in an evil demon world it may be rational for you to regard certain rules as sufficiently reliable in the circumstances (2002: 278). Thus, even in such an extreme scenario, the rules would be the same. At points, Wedgwood does suggest that there may be circumstances in which it is rational to revise one’s belief that a certain rule is reliable (one might have evidence that one is in an epistemically problematic situation). This would seem to allow for some variation in the relevant rules. However, Wedgwood holds that what makes it rational in such a situation to revise one’s belief about the rule’s rationality is further, more basic rules that do not vary from world to world. These are rules that it is rational to follow not in virtue of some other rules, but intrinsically so: ”the only way in which one can reach a rational belief in those rules’ rationality is by means of following those very rules” (2002: 280). See also Wedgwood 1999.

17 That a norm is conditional in form does not automatically imply that it is instrumental. What is distinctive of an instrumental norm is a) that the normative force with which it imbibes acting in a certain way A depends on the subject having a certain goal B, and b) that A’s being a means of achieving B is a contingent fact. (It is thus not an instrumental norm that you ought to move your king and rook in a certain way if you want to castle in chess.)
in principle from that of ‘imperatives’ like ‘if you want to go for a ride, you ought to fill up the car’. Since there are instrumental rules contingent upon any aims whatsoever, this would trivialize the claim that belief is essentially rule-guided.

It is in order to avoid this first part of the dilemma, then, that Wedgwood suggests that the rules that are essential to belief are those that it is rational to believe are reliable means towards the end of truth. Hence, it is not a contingent matter which rules we should follow since it is not a contingent matter which rules it is rational to believe are reliable: No matter what the world is like, it is rational to believe that the rules of rationality are reliable. This move preserves the essentiality of the rules of rationality for belief, but only to land us on the other horn of our dilemma: It undermines the idea that this essentiality derives from the aim of truth. Even if we granted that it necessarily is rational to believe that a given rule of rationality is reliably error-avoiding, this belief may be false. Wedgwood himself holds that evil demon scenarios would be cases in point; there, a choice of rule may be rational even though the rule is not reliable in the circumstances, he claims (2002: 278).

Nevertheless, Wedgwood wants to hold on to the idea that these rules derive from the ‘fundamental norm of correct belief’, that a belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is true: “the ultimate purpose or point of conforming to these standards is not just to have rational or justified beliefs purely for their own sake, but to ensure that one believes the proposition in question if and only if that proposition is true” (2007: 14, emph. ours). A first observation here is that ensuring is factive. I can try to ensure something, for instance, shooting duck only, but whether I in fact ensure this depends on what I actually shoot. On Wedgwood’s construal, an evil demon scenario is like a scenario where I try to ensure shooting ducks only by means of wearing what I have good reason to believe are duck detecting glasses. In fact, what I

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18 A somewhat similar strategy is endorsed by anti-normativists such as Papineau. Papineau (1999) argues that the apparent normativity of belief reduces to a species of instrumental normativity, derived from moral or personal values: \( S \) desires truth and therefore \( S \) ought to judge in such-and-such ways.

19 Unless, of course, the rationality of this meta-belief is itself dependent on contingent matters. As Wedgwood notes there is the threat of a regress here if what makes it rational to believe that rule \( R \) is reliable is always a further rule. This is precisely why he thinks it is necessary to appeal to basic rules, “genuine rules of rationality for all rational beings” (1999: 124).
am wearing are geese detecting glasses. My hunting method thus is such that by employing it I in effect ensure that I shoot only geese. Objectively speaking, my aim – shooting duck only – does not justify or warrant my hunting method. The moral is obvious: Whether an objective aim – be it empirical truth or the shooting of duck – justifies or warrants employing a certain method of acting, or following a certain rule, is as much up to the world as it is up to the world whether the method or rule is reliably error-avoiding. Whether rationality derives from the ‘aim’ of truth is itself a contingent matter.

It might be objected that things look differently from the subject’s own perspective. From the subject’s own perspective, there is no alternative way of ‘aiming at truth’. It is important here not to be carried away by the analogy with intentional action. It is not essential to belief that believers (intentionally) aim at truth. ‘Aiming at truth’ is a metaphor, and the suggestion under consideration is cashing this metaphor in terms of the truth norm: Belief ‘aims at truth’ insofar as it is essential to belief that it is governed by the truth norm. A state thus ‘aims’ at what is correct according to its constitutive norm. But what is correct according to the norms of rationality is not the true, but the rational. Thus, if the rules of rationality are essential to belief, belief ‘aims’ at rationality. Since these ‘aims’ can come apart, what results is paradoxical: Where they come apart, a belief is both correct and incorrect. In other words, it is possible that a belief is such that the subject ought to form it and ought not to form it. This can happen where the norms are prima facie, and thus can be in conflict, but here, the oughts in question are supposed to be essential to belief. Something has to give.

We think there is a general lesson here. It might either be held that the objective ought is essential to belief, in which case the problem of guidance remains unsolved: the rules that do guide, on this view, will be the rules of rationality and these will not be essential to belief. Alternatively, it might be held that the subjective ought is essential to belief, that the rules of rationality are not mere means-ends rules, in which case the objective ought will not be essential to belief. It is not possible to have it both ways: to hold that the objective ought is essential to belief and that the rules of rationality solve the problem of guidance.
The obvious way out for the normativist is to give up on the objective *ought* and hold that it is essential to belief that belief formation is guided by the norms of rationality. The notion of correctness that is essential to belief, then, is not that of truth, but that of *rationality*. Making this move would ensure that the rules of rationality are not merely instrumental, and it would provide norms that are at least candidates for providing guidance. This takes us to the second line of argument in support of belief normativism.

3. The subjective *ought*: norms and rationality

Belief normativism, again, is a specific package of claims. It is essential to belief, the belief normativist holds, that certain norms or rules govern, or guide, belief formation. In this and the next section, we shall investigate whether the ‘rules’ of rationality are the norms of belief in this sense. As in previous sections, the focus will be on *guidance*. In this section, we shall consider whether it is indeed necessary that rational belief be rule-guided. The argument will take the form of a challenge: We shall sketch an account of rational belief that, as far as we can tell, is perfectly non-normative. Since this account of rationality appears to be co-extensional with the belief normativist’s, the challenge is to motivate why any normative element would need to be added.

It is important to be very clear about what is, and what is not, at issue here. We are not disputing that there is an essential connection between belief and rationality. Nor are we disputing that there is such a connection between rationality and (a certain notion of) reasons. What is a-rational in the sense of not even being a candidate for being rational or irrational cannot be belief, we think. Moreover, rationality is essentially a matter of (a certain kind of) reasons. What we are disputing is that belief is essentially such that its formation is guided by the ‘rules’ of rationality. Such

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20 This is the move made by Zangwill (2009). Zangwill stresses that what he takes to be essential to belief is ‘horizontal’ norms, the norms of rationality, not ‘vertical norms’, such as the truth norm.

21 Moreover, we are on record for holding that belief is essentially such that a subject’s belief system instantiates a basic rationality, that is by and large and in the most basic cases actually accords with the ‘rules’ of rationality (cf. Glüer & Wikforss (2009: 48-52). Nothing that we are arguing in this paper hangs on this – Davidsonian – claim, however.
guidance is not necessary, we claim, for being rational. Nor is it necessary for having or providing reasons. That beliefs essentially stand in reasons-relations thus is undisputed ground between the belief normativist and us. The dispute concerns whether it is essential to belief that there are certain norms telling the subject how she ought to reason.

It will be objected that we treat norm-guidedness as if it were an additional feature, something belief could, or could not, have over and above being rational. Frank Jackson for instance argues that rationality and normativity are “interdefinable in an obvious way: rationality is conformity to norms” (2000: 104). On this view, it is simply a conceptual truth that rationality involves governance by norms and, hence, the very suggestion that there is an essential connection between belief and rationality, without belief being normative, expresses a conceptual confusion.

As is our wont, we fail to see the conceptual confusion. In order for this to be more than mere intuition-mongering, we shall now sketch an account of rational belief that is, as far as we can tell, perfectly non-normative. So, here are the bare bones of how we think of rational belief and of reasons relations between beliefs. The relevant notion of a reason is subjective in the sense that we are concerned with reasons a subject has. Strictly speaking, on our account reasons are (true or false) propositions. Having such a reason is simply to believe the relevant proposition. Thus, beliefs, as we also like to put it, provide their subjects with reasons. The reasons themselves, the propositions that are the contents of the relevant beliefs, stand in inferential or evidential relations. And beliefs stand in reasons relations because their contents stand in these relations; reasons relations between beliefs ‘piggy-back’ on the inferential or evidential relations their contents stand in. This means that a belief that

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22 One could thus say the notion of a reason employed here is doubly subjective: Not only are we concerned with reasons the subject has, but these reasons need not be true, either. Of course, there are other, more objective ways of thinking about reasons on the market. We are not disputing the usefulness or legitimacy of such notions. We do think, however, that the notion of subjective reasons our sketch works with captures an important aspect of our folk-psychology, its reasons explanations and the notion of (subjective) rationality that comes with them. This rationality, it seems to us, is not essentially normative. See also below, fn. 25, 27.

23 Note that this is distinct from the claim that the subject would have to know that p is a reason. To have a reason, a subject does not need to possess the concept of a reason. Nor does the subject need to possess the concept of belief. On our construal of having a reason, no second order beliefs – beliefs about beliefs – are required.
\( p \) provides its subject with a reason for believing that \( q \) if and only if there is a valid (logical or ‘material’) inference from \( p \) to \( q \). With reasons relations thus in place, we can then say that it is rational for a subject \( S \) to believe that \( p \) iff \( p \) is evidentially supported (to a sufficient degree) by the reasons the subject has.\(^{24}\) Rationality in general thus becomes a matter of the degree to which a subject’s beliefs in fact instantiate the pattern of evidential relations between their contents.\(^{25}\) Obviously, there are a lot of details to be worked out here. But it is fairly clear even from this rough sketch that there won’t be any need to add that there is rule-guidance. Whether or not the degree to which a person’s beliefs instantiate the ‘rules’ of rationality can be explained as a result of these rules simply does not matter. The only thing that matters is (the degree of) accordance with these ‘rules’ or patterns.

At this juncture, it is common to appeal to the idea that we have certain normative attitudes towards errors of reasoning. Asking how belief could lack a normative dimension, Jackson continues: “Are we supposed to say that there is nothing wrong with representing that \( P \), and that if \( P \) then \( Q \), while refraining from representing that \( Q \)” (2000: 112). The answer, we take it, is that in such a case the subject is being irrational, but that it is a further question whether holding an irrational belief is wrong in the sense of violating a norm.\(^{26}\) To retort that it must be wrong since

\(^{24}\) Rationality thus depends on all the relevant reasons a subject has for and against believing a proposition and their relative strengths. These include reasons provided by beliefs about inferential or evidential connections between propositions. Thus a belief to the effect that \( p \) and \( q \) are not inferentially connected can defeat a reason for believing \( q \) provided by believing \( p \). The same holds for being agnostic about the presence of such a relation. It is thus not automatically the case that it would be rational to believe all the logical or ‘material’ consequences of our beliefs.

\(^{25}\) It should be clear from this that our notion of a subjective reason, or of subjective rationality, has an objective component: It is an objective matter what the inferential or evidential relations between propositions are. What is subjective about our account is a) that rationality depends on the reasons the subject in fact has, i.e. those propositions she believes, and b) that these propositions need not be true. This notion of subjective rationality obviously owes a great deal to Davidson. It is rather different from the notion of subjective rationality for instance employed by Kolodny (2005). He is concerned with a certain kind of second-order belief: Belief about what rationality requires one to believe. It is subjectively rational, in Kolodny's sense, to have a first-order belief \( Bp \) if one has a second-order belief \( BBp \) – if one believes, that is, that rationality requires one to believe \( p \). This holds independently of whether \( BBp \) is true, and independently of whether one in fact has any (first-order) reasons for \( Bp \). On our view, by contrast, if one lacks (first order) reasons for \( Bp \) then \( Bp \) is subjectively irrational – even if one believes that it is rational.

\(^{26}\) It is also a further question whether ‘wrong’ here is an evaluative notion, and, if so, whether the value in question derives from the nature of belief rather than from something else (such as evolutionary or ethical considerations).
it is irrational is simply begging the question. What is needed here is a substantive argument to the effect that rationality has to be spelled out in normative terms.

Let us be perfectly clear as to what we are claiming here. It has become customary to speak of the very notion of a reason as being a normative notion. On this assumption, the claim that rationality is not normative amounts to a denial of the idea that there is an essential link between rationality and reasons. However, as should be obvious by now, this is emphatically not our claim. Indeed, if there is any claim in the offing here that might be a conceptual truth it is this: Being rational is a matter of the reasons relations between beliefs. On this notion of a reason, it is very hard to see how a wedge could be driven between rationality and reasons. When we claim that rationality is not normative we are thus not questioning the link between rationality and reasons. Rather, we are questioning the normativist construal of both.

There is an interesting parallel here between this debate and that concerning the normativity of meaning. In the case of meaning, normativists have appealed to the

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27 Those claiming that rationality and reasons can come apart typically employ an objective notion of reason. According to such a notion the mere fact that a plate of food contains salmonella is a reason not to eat it (cf. Broome (2007: 167)). Nevertheless, eating it might be perfectly rational if there is no evidence of the salmonella. On our account, what is relevant to the subject’s rationality is not that it is true that the plate contains salmonella but whether or not the subject believes this. Thus, rationality and reasons, in our sense, cannot come apart in this way.

We are not disputing that there are objective reasons or that there is a point to the terminology of objective reasons. If there is to be a point to this terminology, however, ‘reason’ can’t just be a fancy term for ordinary facts. Rather, there seems to be a connected idea that only certain facts can be reasons: those that make it the case that it is ‘fitting’ to have certain attitudes towards certain objects (see for instance Rabinowicz & Rönnow-Rasmussen (2004). On the basis of this idea it is then claimed that objective reasons are normative because the notion of fittingness is normative. Leaving aside the question of how this notion of normativity is to be understood, it provides further illustration of the importance of separating objective reasons, in this sense, from subjective ones: From objective reasons’ being normative, in the sense of making it fitting to have certain attitudes towards certain objects, it obviously does not follow that subjective reasons are normative in any sense.

28 In contradistinction to Broome (2007), who questions the normativist construal of rationality but not that of reasons. To Broome the question whether rationality is normative therefore comes down to the question whether the fact that rationality requires S to believe p entails that S has a reason to believe p. Defending anti-normativism about rationality, Broome provides a negative answer to this question. But we wonder whether the resulting position is stable. We agree that that rationality requires S to believe p is not a reason for believing p. That is, believing that rationality requires me to believe p does not, just by itself, provide me with a reason for believing p. This would be bootstrapping. However, if rationality does require me to believe p I must have a reason to believe p. How else could it be rational for me to believe p?
fact that meaningful expressions necessarily have conditions of correct use. From this, it has been argued, it directly follows that there are certain norms governing a speaker $S$’s use of an expression $E$, norms such as ‘$S$ ought to apply $E$ to $x$ if($f$) $E$ is true of $x’$. In response to what we have called the ‘simple argument’, we have urged that the notion of semantic correctness is not normative, but merely allows us to categorize the application of $E$ into two kinds: the true and the false, for instance. That is, from the fact that $E$ has certain correctness conditions, it does not directly follow that $E$ should or ought to be applied in any particular way. What both the semantic normativist and the anti-normativist agree on, however, is the extension of ‘semantically correct’. It is not the classification of uses into the semantically correct and incorrect that is at issue. The same applications of an expression will be classified as correct (incorrect) by both camps. In order to have a case, the semantic normativist therefore has to provide further motivation as to why a normative element has to be added to the non-normative notion in order to make it into a notion of semantic correctness.

Similarly, the belief normativist's concept of rationality appears to be co-extensive with the non-normativist account sketched above: We do not disagree about which beliefs in fact are rational (and which are irrational). Again, in order to have a case here, the normativist has to motivate why the normative dimension has to be added, why no non-normative concept suffices as a concept of rational belief. Otherwise, the normativity in question becomes a perfectly idle ingredient of the normativist’s concept of rational belief. It might be thought that idleness can be avoided by rejecting the claim that the normativist and the anti-normativist conceptions of rationality are co-extensional. However, this would be ill advised.

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29 These might be truth conditions, assertability conditions, or some such, depending on the choice of basic semantic concept.
31 This might easily be obscured by the fact that there are a number of other parameters that need to be set before we can compare any given normativist and non-normativist account of rationality. As far as we can see, all of these are parameters on which one can go either externalist or internalist, objective or subjective. The maybe most pertinent such parameters concern evidence and the validity of inference, especially ‘material’ inference. As hinted above (fn. 15), material inferential relations might well be hostage to the world. But these are issues that are independent of normativism vs. non-normativism. Once they have been settled, normative and non-normative accounts of rationality will, as far as we can see, be necessarily co-extensional.
Since there presumably is agreement on both sides concerning the extent to which a subject's beliefs instantiate any given inferential pattern, rejecting co-extensionality would require accepting that a belief may be classified as irrational despite being inferentially well supported. The challenge, thus, is to motivate normativism while accepting the co-extensionality claim.

We would like to end by posing an additional challenge to belief normativism, one that was mentioned briefly in our 2009 paper. The trouble concerns guidance again, although this time the trouble is completely independent of what the relevant norm might be.

4. The regress of motivations

We suggested above that the intuitive conception of rule-guidedness requires a (substantive) distinction between being guided by a rule and merely acting in accordance with one. For there to be guidance the rule has to make a difference to (the formation and explanation of) S's behavior; in some sense to be specified, it has to be that S acts in accordance with the rule because of the rule.

Now, the most natural, intuitive idea is that a performance A is guided by a rule R iff R plays a certain role in S's motivation for A. Furthermore, it is very natural and intuitive to spell this out in terms of an intentional condition on rule-guidedness: The role R plays in S's motivation for A is such that there will be a certain kind of intentional explanation for A. This in turn is the kind of intentional explanation that involves some form of acceptance of R. Using a belief-desire model of intentional explanation that ought to be fairly uncontroversial in this context, such an explanation would have to include at least two components: Acceptance of the rule on the part of S in the motivational slot, and a belief to the effect that a specific performance is in accordance with the rule. In our 2009 paper, we suggested that the result of applying

\[32\] Belief normativists in general recognize the need for this distinction. For example, Wedgwood stresses the distinction between conforming to a rule and following it (2000: 276, 287). See also Shah & Velleman (2005: 502-503) and Shah (2003: 459).

\[33\] For more on the idea of an intentional condition on rule-guidedness, see Boghossian (2008) and Glüer & Wikforss (2010b).
these very intuitive ideas about rule-guidedness to belief is a (practical) syllogism of this form:  

(P1) I want to believe what is in accordance with R.
(P2) To believe that p is in accordance with R.
(C) I want to believe that p.

It should of course be immediately clear why applying this model of rule guidance causes trouble for belief normativism. The trouble is that the practical inference requires S to have another belief, the belief that believing that p is in accordance with the norm. However, according to the normativist, this further belief would also have to be motivated by a rule, if it is to qualify as a belief, which is to say that there would have to be yet another belief in place. Thus, we embark on a vicious regress, a regress we have called the regress of motivations. Hence, if guidance by rules is understood along the lines suggested here, it cannot be that a state is a belief only if it is formed as a result of S being guided by certain rules.

Is there a way out for the normativist? It is instructive to compare the regress of motivations with more familiar regresses in the epistemological literature. For example, it is well-known that certain versions of justificational internalism threaten to lead to a regress. According to what is sometimes called ‘awareness internalism’, for instance, a belief B is justified only insofar as there is something X that is a justifier of B and S is both aware of X and believes that X is relevant to the justification of B. The question then arises what justifies S's belief that X is relevant to the justification of B. On the assumption that the principle just specified holds for

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34 Glüer & Wikforss (2009a: 55). As a model for practical reasoning resulting in rule-guided action, this is developed in Glüer & Pagin (1999). There, it is argued that rules that can play this role cannot at the same time be meaning constitutive.
35 Regardless of what one in general thinks of the belief-desire model of practical reasoning, it should not be controversial that some slot for a belief relating the (general) rule to a particular performance will be required here.
36 In the 2009 paper we are careful to distinguish this regress from another regress, a regress we call the regress of contents, which is targeted specifically at the content normativist position (2009: 56-57). As we stress there, the regress of motivations holds independently of what view one takes on the determination of content.
37 For a recent discussion of internalism and various regress problems see Bergmann (2006).
all justified beliefs, a regress ensues. For present purposes, we shall simply call this the ‘regress of justification’.

A common response to this regress is to limit the applicability of the internalist principle, arguing that not all beliefs derive their justification this way. Although we may have reasons to believe that certain methods are truth-conducive, and others are not, ultimately there must be justified beliefs that are not in this sense derived from reasons. As we saw above, Wedgwood makes a move of this kind when he argues that while it is rational to regard certain rules of rationality as error-avoiding, i.e. that there are reasons for regarding the rules that way, it cannot be that this holds for all rules. Instead, he appeals to basic rules: rules that it is rational to follow even though they are not such that “the only thing that makes it rational to follow these basic rules is the fact that it is rational to regard them as reliable” (Wedgwood 2002: 280).

Whatever the merits of such a strategy in response to the regress of justification, it should be clear that it does not help with the regress of motivations. Let us grant that certain beliefs are basic in the sense that they cannot be justified by appeal to further beliefs but derive their justification from other sources (i.e. they are self-justifying, in some sense, or have an externalist justification). Applied explicitly to a normativist version of internalism such as Wedgwood's, let us grant that there are certain basic rules of rationality that do not need justification from further beliefs. The regress of motivations remains, since it does not turn on the idea that the belief that a performance is in accordance with the relevant rule is justified, but merely on the idea that that belief, too, is formed as a result of S following certain rules. The regress, that is, is not a regress of theoretical reason, but a regress of practical reasoning. Hence the label: regress of motivations. Here, none of the familiar responses employed in response to the regress of justification apply.

It might be thought, however, that even if the move to be employed is not literally the same, it is strictly analogous. In the wake of Wittgenstein's rule-following

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38 This and various related regresses have a long history especially in the debate between foundationalists and coherentists. A similar version can be found in Sellars (1956).

39 In this respect, also, the regress of motivations differs from Lewis Carroll's well-known regress. The latter is a regress of theoretical reasoning, showing that the rules of logic cannot function as premises in our reasoning (Carroll 1895).
considerations it has become popular to appeal to the notion of blind rule-following.\textsuperscript{40} Although the detailed exegesis of Wittgenstein's discussion is much disputed it is clear that he puts forth a regress argument of some sort, arguing that if one takes rule-following always to involve interpretation then following a rule will be impossible.\textsuperscript{41}

In response to this problem it has been suggested that we need to accept that there is a form of rule-following that does not involve any sense of intentionally conforming to the rule: blind rule-following. Blind rule-following does not involve any intentional condition, and yet is supposed to be a genuine species of rule-following, distinct from mere brute reactions. This, in a sense, mirrors the move made in the case of the regress of justification: Just as there must be a form of ‘basic’ justification, justification that does not involve appeal to further beliefs, there must be a form of ‘basic’ rule-following, rule-following that does not appeal to further beliefs.

Giving up on the intentional condition on rule-guidance, however, brings us back to square one. There must, we said, be a substantive distinction between mere accordance with a rule, mere regularity, and genuine rule-guidance. How is this distinction to be substantiated once we give up on the most natural and intuitive understanding of it? A quietist refusal to answer this question – as endorsed for instance by McDowell and Crispin Wright\textsuperscript{42} – cannot but fail to be persuasive in this context. After all, the intuitive, intentional condition appears to be satisfied in all uncontroversial cases of rule-guidedness. Giving it up in precisely certain controversial cases, cases to do with intentional states and their contents, would seem to be a perfectly ad hoc move, simply intended to save a normativist theory under severe pressure. If belief normativism requires endorsing quietism about rule-guidance, so much the worse for belief normativism.

Another, related normativist strategy proposes that there is a form of rule-guidance that is not intentional but takes place on the sub-personal level.\textsuperscript{43} It might

\textsuperscript{40} Wittgenstein (1953). For an appeal to the notion of blind rule-following see for instance Wright (2007) and Boghossian (2008).
\textsuperscript{41} We spell out our interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following argument in Glüer & Wikforss (2010a).
\textsuperscript{42} McDowell (1984, 1992) and Wright (2007). We discuss blindness and quietism in Glüer & Wikforss (2010a: 160-164).
\textsuperscript{43} Such a strategy is employed by Pierre Jacob (2005) with respect to the normativity of meaning and content. And Anders Nes, in his response to an earlier version of our paper,
be argued that in the very basic cases, such as belief formation, rule-guidance is not to be understood in terms of motivation, but in terms of some form of sub-personal regulation, possibly construed teleologically. So far, however, this remains the merest suggestion. So far, that is, there is no way of telling whether it can be developed into a recognizable distinction between mere accordance with a rule and being guided by it. This, then, is the challenge the regress of motivations poses for the normativist: To come up with a substantive, non-intentional condition that is intuitively recognizable as distinguishing rule-guidedness from mere regularity or accordance with a rule.44

Since we agree with the belief normativist that rational belief is a matter of the degree to which a subject’s beliefs actually are in accordance with the ‘rules’ of rationality, the challenges posed in this and the previous section combine into a fairly formidable package. Even if the normativist provided a condition that would allow rational belief to recognizably be the result of rule-guidance, he would still need to argue why it is necessary that rational belief be formed in this way, rather than in any other way that ensures a sufficient degree of accordance with the ‘rules’ in question.

We conclude that the idea that belief is essentially rule-guided faces serious problems and challenges. More precisely, it is the idea of guidance that seems responsible for these troubles. This seems to us to hold regardless of whether the norm constitutive of belief is construed as one of truth, of rationality, or a combination thereof. Belief normativism, as standardly construed, is thus not a plausible theory of the nature of belief. As stressed above, rejecting normativism is not rejecting the idea that there is an essential link between belief and rationality. On the contrary, once rationality itself is construed non-normatively, it appears to be perfectly open to the anti-normativist to claim that it is essential to belief that beliefs stand in rational relations to one another. In our opinion, it is even essential to belief that beliefs by and large instantiate a basic rationality, i.e. not only stand in reasons relations making them rational or irrational, but are in fact by and large rational.

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44 We discuss this further in Glüer & Wikforss (2009b: 39-41).
Indeed, as we have pointed out at some length elsewhere, this Davidsonian claim coheres better with anti-normativism than with normativism.\(^{45}\) According to the normativist, what is essential to belief is merely that if a state is a belief then it *ought* to behave in certain ways, it *ought* to play a certain role. Our view, by contrast, is that it is essential to belief that it *does* play a certain role – but we shall have to save the details of that story for another occasion.\(^{46,47}\)

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\(^{45}\) See Glüer & Wikforss (2009a: 48-50).

\(^{46}\) We made a stab at a full non-normativist account of belief along these lines in our paper ‘What is Belief?’, presented at the CSMN workshop *The Aim of Belief*, Oslo June 11-13, 2009. A recording is available from the CSMN homepage. We would like to thank the participants of the workshop for their helpful comments. Special thanks to Anders Nes who was our commentator in Oslo. We would also like to thank the participants of the Stockholm Logic and Language seminar where we presented this paper, in particular Sören Häggqvist, Sara Packalén, Peter Pagin, Dag Prawitz, and Dag Westerståhl. And we would like to thank Jonas Olson and two anonymous referees who all provided written comments.

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