My principal interest is in philosophy of language, especially in its intersection with philosophy of mind. My dissertation "Linguistic Freedom: An Essay on Meaning and Rules" (UMI Dissertation Services, 1996) challenges the common view that speaking a language is an essentially rule-guided activity. Since completing the dissertation I have written papers on meaning and norms, and I have cooperated with Kathrin Glüer-Pagin on several papers discussing the alleged normativity of meaning and mental content as well as that of of belief. Most recently, we have written on reasons and argued for a non-normativist construal of these.
Another main topic of my research is externalism, applied to meaning as well as to mental content. I have written on the semantics of natural kind terms (including three papers together with Sören Häggqvist) criticizing the widely shared view that these terms constitute a distinct semantic category among the kind terms. I have also written several papers on content externalism and incomplete understanding, arguing that content externalism fails to give a plausible account of the individual's cognitive perspective. In 2006 I received a research grant from The Swedish Research Council, for the project 'Minds and Kinds', which aimed to develop an alternative account of general terms and concepts. I have also worked on the topic of linguistic understanding and to what extent this need be construed epistemically. Relatedly, I have worked on the topic of the extended mind, in particular as applied to belief.
In addition, I have worked on content externalism and self-knowledge and in 2003 I received a two-year research grant from The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation for the project 'Knowing One's Own Thoughts'. I have also written on related issues within epistemology, for instance on knowledge of other minds. Currently I am working on knowledge of one's own beliefs, in particular on the justification of second-order beliefs. I have a book contract with Oxford University Press for Self-Knowledge. On Knowing One's Own Thoughts and Beliefs.
I am also working on a joint project with Kathrin Glüer on the nature of belief, funded by The Swedish Reasearch Council, 2013. The aim is to develop an original version of functionalism, 'reason providing functionalism', which characterizes belief in terms of the role it plays in practical and theoretical reasoning.