SPRING and FALL 2016

 

UMEÅ UNIVERSITY

Reference and Acquaintance  (7,5 hp)
Lecturers: Jessica Pepp (Umeå)
Course dates: October 17 – 21
For further information/registration, please contact Lars Samuelsson (lars.samuelsson@umu.se)

 

Our thoughts and the utterances with which we express our thoughts are about things. Many philosophers share the intuition that some thoughts and utterances are about things in a more robust and fundamental sense than others. For instance, my thought that Zlatan Ibrahimovic is tall is a thought about Zlatan Ibrahimovic in a more robust sense than my thought that whoever is the oldest human is more than 50 years old is a thought about person X (if X happens to be the oldest human). But what does this greater robustness consist in? Bertrand Russell, who brought the contrast to prominence in the recent history of philosophy, thought it key that the more robust kind of about-ness requires the thinker or speaker to be acquainted with what her thought or utterance is about. The plan for the course is to discuss a range of ideas about the role that acquaintance might play in elucidating the intuitive contrast. With these on the table, we will go on to discuss questions such as: Which notion or notions of acquaintance are most relevant to elucidating the intuitive distinction? Is appeal to acquaintance of any sort required or helpful in elucidating the distinction? Is there really a distinction between types of about-ness to be elucidated?

 

 

GÖTEBORG UNIVERSITY
Metaphysical Explanation (7,5 hp)
Lecturers: Anna-Sofia Maurin (Göteborg) & Daniel Giberman (University of Texas at Arlington)
Course dates: September 15 – 16 + 19-21

Course description
Our understanding of the world is mediated through explanations. I understand that my foot hurts right now because I just kicked the table leg, or that the artwork is beautiful because the artist is very talented. But these somewhat familiar causal/scientific explanations are not the only kinds of explanation we give. My being in pain may also be explained with reference to my being in a particular brain state, and the artwork's beauty can be explained in terms of its composition. These are so-called metaphysical explanations. Explanations which, rather than explaining a certain effect with reference to its cause, take you from what is less to what is more fundamental; to what depends for its existence on something else, to that on which its existence is grounded. It is a kind of explanation you find both in- and outside of philosophy (in fact, as soon as you start looking, it is a kind of explanation that is everywhere), yet which has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. As a consequence, it is a kind of explanation whose nature and application are relatively speaking ill-understood (a circumstance which threatens its justified use in theory evaluation and theory comparison).
In this course, we take a closer look at metaphysical explanation from a number of different perspectives including: (1) its nature as a kind of explanation; (2) its relationship to so-called grounding relations; (3) what epistemic virtues (if any) it ought to exemplify; (4) if (and if so, how) metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal explanation.

Set-up: Teaching includes lectures and seminars plus obligatory attendance at the two-day international symposium on metaphysical explanation scheduled for Sep 20-21 (featuring talks by, apart from Maurin and Giberman; Ricki Bliss, Einar Bohn, Alexander Skiles, Robin Stenwall, Naomi Thompson, Kelly Torgdon, Tobias Wilsch, and Alastair Wilson). A conference website is under construction.
Literature: Readings will include but not be limited to texts by most of the speakers at the conference. A detailed literature list will be available beginning of June.

For further information/registration, please contact Anna-Sofia Maurin

 

UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
Moral Disagreement (7,5 hp)
Lecturers: Don Loeb (Vermont) & Folke Tersman (Uppsala)
Course dates: May 23 – 27

Course description
Många som förordar en anti-objektivistisk eller anti-realistisk hållning inom meta-etiken åberopar den djupgående oenighet som ofta påstås förekomma rörande moraliska frågor. Kursen kommer att behandla hur diskussionen kring denna strategi har utvecklats under senare år. Därvid kommer vi att undersöka hur diskussionen om moralisk oenighet förhåller sig till den debatt inom kunskapsteorin som fokuserar på ”peer disagreement”, hur argumenten som hänvisar till oenighet är relaterade till andra anti-realistiska argument (inklusive de som hänvisar till så kallade ”undergrävande förklaringar”), samt om samma strategi rimligen kan användas inom andra filosofiska områden där det också finns oenighet (som kunskapsteori) och om det i sin tur är relevant för bedömningen av argumentet. Undervisningen kommer att utgå från ett antal artiklar som finns tillgängliga genom universitetsbibliotekets e-tjänster. Studenterna förväntas att vara aktiva på olika sätt, och kan få i uppgift att förbereda och inleda diskussionen kring någon viss artikel. Sessionerna kommer att ha en seminariekaraktär.

For more information see this page.

For registration, please contact Rysiek Sliwinski

 

UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
Hannah Arendts The Life of the Mind (7,5 hp)
Lecturer: Sharon Rider (Uppsala)
Course dates: May 9 – 13

Course description
Hannah Arendt is considered by many to be one of the deepest political philosophers of the twentieth century. In this course, however, we will concentrate on her philosophy of mind, and the central concepts of thinking, willing and judging. For Arendt, thinking and knowing are distinct notions. To ignore this distinction is to "mistake the need to think with the urge to know” Thinking, for Arendt, is strictly speaking not “about” facts or about the world, but is rather the indispensable source of meaning in all experience. In this sense, it does not “grasp truths”, but is rather a prerequisite for such grasping. At the same time, thoughtlessness leads to evil action in the world. What is required for ethical action, then, is judgment. We will work through the Arendtian framework together in a series of lectures and seminars in which participants will present and discuss problems and issues arising from our readings. Participants are expected to have read most of LoM in advance, and selections från LKPP during the course, and submit a final paper within two weeks after the last seminar. The grade will be based on participation, the presentations, and the final paper.

 

Literature:
Arendt, Hannah, The Life of the Mind. Harcourt 1978.

Arendt, Hannah, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, 1989

For further information and registration, please contact Rysiek Sliwinski

 

LUND UNIVERSITY
Presocratic Philosophy (7,5 hp)
Lecturer: John Hartman (Lund)
Course dates: April 11 – 15

Course description
Using the new translation of the presocratic fragments and testimonies by Daniel Graham, this course will cover presocratic philosophy from Thales to Democritus. There will be a general discussion of the nature and validity of fragments and testimonies, as well as the cultural setting, but foremost we will discuss those philosophers and schools that are relevant to modern philosophy. Amongst the Ionian philosophers we will focus on Heraclitus and Xenophanes, from Italy Pythagoras, Empedocles, and the Eleatic school with Parmenides and Zeno. We then turn to Athens and Anaxagoras, and we end with a discussion of Democritus. Apart from Graham's translation additional papers on the mentioned philosophers will be used. There will be a mixture of lectures and seminars, and students will be asked to present and comment on one of the papers included in the course. In addition to this, in order to complete the course, students will be asked to write an examination paper on one of the presocratics.

Literature:
Daniel Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy. Cambridge 2010.

For further information, please contact Jan Hartman

To register e-mail Ylva von Gerber

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GOTHENBURG UNIVERSITY
Moral Responsibility, Free Will, and Politics (7,5 hp)
Lecturer: Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco)
Course dates: May 23 – 27

Course description
This seminar will consider recent work that investigates moral responsibility and free will, and the rela- tionship of both to issues in social and political philosophy. Until recently, the majority of philosophical work on moral responsibility was pursued in connection with debates about the metaphysics of free will. However, moral responsibility has recently emerged as a topic in its own right. One strand of this work has emphasized the role of contexts or situations in structuring the dispositions or capacities for morally responsible agency. For such accounts, political and social arrangements play an important, if poorly un- derstood role in scaffolding human freedom and moral responsibility. Such a view suggests that if our cul- pability is partly a function of social context, then the answers to many questions about freedom and re- sponsibility depend on features of our social arrangements. These issues are the subject matter of this course.
This course will begin with an overview of contemporary debates about free will. It will then focus on re- cent accounts of moral responsibility (e.g., by Doris, Vargas, and others) that emphasize pictures of agency that are sometimes characterized as “porous” “ecological” or “socially-embedded.” Such accounts have ramifications for a range of substantive political and legal issues, including the obligations of states to fos- ter responsible agency, the justification of criminal punishment, and whether and how we can shape the social environment without undermining human freedom and responsibility. So, the final portion of the course will be concerned with such issues. Among the topics that may figure in this final portion of the course are such issues as retributive punishment, adaptive preferences, ideological structuring of choices, and “nudges” or modifications to choice architecture that are designed to produce pro-social results with- out infringing on freedom of choice.

More information is available here

To register e-mail Andreas Ott

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LUND UNIVERSITY
The Philosophy of Punishment (7,5 hp)
Lecturer: Ben Bramble
Course dates: April 25 – 29

Course description
In this course, we will look at recent philosophical work on the nature and justification of punishment. We will begin by asking what punishment is. We will then examine leading justifications that have been offered of punishment by the state, both consequentialist and non-consequentialist. Next, we will consider various arguments for the claim that punishment is never justified. The nature and possibility of moral responsibility will loom large in these investigations. Specific readings will focus on: the coherence of retributivism, the sufficiency of utilitarian justifications, the nature of desert, the possible value of punishment for an offender, free will and implications of neuroscience, alternatives to punishment (including restorative justice).

Literature:
The Problem of Punishment by David Boonin (2008), Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 9780521709613

The Future of Punishment by Thomas Nadelhoffer (2013), Oxford University Press, ISBN: 9780199779208

The Immorality of Punishment by Michael J. Zimmerman (2011), Broadview Press, ISBN 9781554810550.

 

For more information contact Ylva von Gerber

 

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STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
The Axiomatic Theory of Abstract Objects (7,5 hp)
Lecturer: Ed Zalta (Stanford)
Course dates: April 25 – 28

Course description
In this course, we present an overview of the body of theorems formally derivable from the axioms of the theory of abstract objects. The axioms are motivated and presented in the first lecture, and in the remaining lectures we go through the definitions and theorems that systematize a variety of philosophical applications. We shall identify, and derive principles governing: truth-values, logical classes, Forms, fictions, situations, possible worlds, impossible worlds, concepts (including complete individual concepts), Fregean senses, Fregean (natural) numbers, and theoretical mathematical individuals and relations generally.

Detailed schedule can be found here.

For more information contact Mattias Högström

 

 

 

UMEÅ UNIVERSITY
Ontology of Fiction
Lecturer: Ben Caplan (Ohio Sate University)
Course dates: May 11 – 15
More is information is available here.

Course description
The course is on fictional realism, the view that there are fictional characters. In
particular, it is on abstract creationism, the variety of fictional realism according to
which fictional characters are actually existing abstract objects. The course will be
structured about Lectures I-III and VI of Saul Kripke’s Reference and Existence and
Chapters 6-8 of Anthony Everett’s The Nonexistent.
Topics to be covered will include some of the following: arguments for and against
the existence of fictional characters; arguments for and against the creation of
fictional characters; the distinction between instantiating a property and instantiating a
property according to a fiction; the differences, if any, between fictional and mythical
objects; negative existentials; the identity and distinctness of fictional characters; and
(relatedly) the number of fictional characters.

For further information and registration contact Jonas Nilsson.

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GÖTEBORG UNIVERSITY
Spatiotemporally Located Entities
Lecturer: Daniel Giberman
Course dates: March 2 – 6
More is information is available here.

Course description
Think about a pair of shoes you wore recently. The two shoes probably resemble one another in color, shape, weight, etc., and they definitely take up some space. Here’s a funny sounding question: does the shoes’ color, shape, or weight take up any space? If so, how do these features exist in space? Do they have parts? Do they have their own sizes and shapes? And if they do not take up any space, then how do they get to characterize things that do take up space, such as your shoes?

Let us set colors, shapes, and weights aside for now and just think of the shoes again. Is the space taken up by the shoes something different from the shoes? If so, what is it like and why do the shoes take it up so perfectly? What is it for an entity to ‘take up some space’ in this sense? If the space is not something different from the shoes then could the shoes have existed even if they had no color or weight (as it seems space can exist)? Do the shoes have parts? Are the shoes parts of anything? If they have parts, do any of those parts not have parts? If they are parts of anything, are any of the things of which they are parts not parts of anything? Are things without parts fundamental in some sense? Are things that are not parts of anything fundamental in some sense?

Finally, consider how the shoes take up time. Can they change over time? Suppose the left one gets a scuff and loses some of its color. Is it still the same shoe? If not, then over time what seemed to be a pair of shoes is much more than a pair! If so, however, then how can it be that the one thing, the left shoe, is entirely un-scuffed at one time and scuffed at another? After all, being entirely un-scuffed and being scuffed are incompatible features, so how can one shoe have them both? “Well,” someone might say, “by having them at different times.” Okay. But what is it to have a feature at one time but not another? Is that like having a feature at one spatial location but not another? Or is it an entirely different sort of suggestion? Can something have different features at different times without having temporal analogs of spatial parts?

I hope these questions make your shoes seem more interesting than they seemed before I asked them. If they do, then you might well enjoy this course, which will examine what some selections from the recent analytic metaphysics literature have to say about such questions. The course will include introductory lectures on the assigned readings, but much of the class time will be spent in workshop-style discussion of both a clarifying and a critical nature. Thorough preparation and active participation are thus mandatory.

Readings include work by Lewis, Armstrong, Sider, Schaffer, Lowe, and
Haslanger, among many others.

For questions or registration email Daniel Giberman

 

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Erasmus Course in Bayesian Epistemology
Lecturer: Dr. Jurgen Landes (School of European Culture and Language, Kent University)
Dates: May 18-22

Course description
Every day we find ourselves in situations where we do not have complete, accurate and fully trust-worthy information on all the relevant aspects. Based on our beliefs of what the relevant aspects are, we chose to act, or not to act, in a certain way. This raises the questions of what our beliefs in the relevant aspects are and how we form them. The currently most popular approach to tackle these questions is Bayesian epistemology, in particular subjective Bayesian epistemology. Objective Bayesian Epistemology is emerging as a viable contender which is currently being developed in Kent.

In this course on formal epistemology, we will explore the subjective and the objective approach with an emphasis on objective Bayesianism.
The course is supported by an Erasmus Teaching Exchange Agreement between Kent University and Lund University.

More information is available here.

To register for the course email Ylva von Gerber.

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UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
Self-knowledge, 7,5 hp
Lecturer: Pauliina Remes
Course dates: February 9 – 13
More is information is available here.

Course description
Our relationship to ourselves seems special. While I certainly learn things about myself in the same way that I learn things about trees outside in the park, or of people in my family, or faraway cultures, it has seemed to many that some things about ourselves are available to us in a special way. Arguably, I am the only person in the world that knows when and how much it hurts in my back, infallibly or incorrigibly, without having to do any extra work to gain this knowledge. It also seems that no-one can challenge that I am in pain, that today's wind feels cold to me, or that I am the sole person to be likely to know, without reporting it, which thought I entertained when just entering the library. I have a first-personal authority over at least some of my mental states. Within history of philosophy, this kind of immediate relationship has sometimes been lifted to a privileged and fundamental position within a given epistemological theory as a whole.
The course is a course on self-knowledge as an epistemological phenomenon: on what today is most frequently called 'self-knowledge' within a broadly analytical approach; on different theories on self-knowledge; on whether self-knowledge as knowledge of one's own mental states is special, and what this specialty possibly could involve. We will also attempt to differentiate self-knowledge understood in this way from other, related concepts like that of self-awareness.

Students are asked to register by email to Pauliina Remes by January 26th, 2015.

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STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
The Ethics of War, 7,5 hp
Lecturer: Helen Frowe
Course dates: February 2-6

Course description
This course will explore recent work in the ethics of war. Likely topics include just causes for war, the role of legitimate authority in war, necessity and proportionality, the moral status of combatants and the principle of non-combatant immunity. The course will be delivered by a combination of interactive lectures and reading group-style seminars, based on readings circulated before the start of the course. There will also be opportunities for students to give short presentations.

Course is full, it is no longer possible to register.

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STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
A priori justification, 7,5 hp
Lecturer: Mikael Janvid
Course dates: May 4-8

Course description
The course investigates recent developments in the debate on a priori justification. We shall discuss papers selected from Albert Casullo’s latest collection Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification, but also a chapter ”Grades of A Priori Justification” from David Henderson’s and Terry Horgan’s book The Epistemological Spectrum. Participants in the course are expected to present these papers during the seminars as well as write an assignment.

More information is available here.

To register for the course please email Mikael Janvid

Fall 2014

UMEÅ UNIVERSITY
Applying Applied Ethics, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: David Archer
Course dates: November 10 – 14
More is information is available here.

Course description
'Applying Applied Ethics' – this phrase is Francis Kamm's and describes the use of philosophical methods to understand and evaluate the ways in which the particular practical recommendations of applied moral philosophers might be realised in the real world of politics, law and policy.
The teaching programme would examine, inter alia, the following issues: the distinctive methodology of applied ethics (the distinction between theory and 'application'; theory and intuitions; 'top-down' versus 'bottom-up' models of applied ethics); ideal versus non-ideal theory; realism, normative theory and the feasibility constraint; moral expertise; democracy and the Platonic 'expertise and good governance' challenge; compromise, both moral and non-moral; the practical obligations of moral philosophers; the 'dirty hands' problem and the nature of politics.

For registration and further information contact Jonas Nilsson

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UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
Philosophy of Law, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Patricia Mindus
Guest-lecturer: Marco Goldoni (Glasgow Law School)
Course dates: September 2 – October 9
All information is available here.

Core areas: practical philosophy, philosophy of law, jurisprudence, political philosophy, ethics
Relevant areas of application: legal theory, political theory, legal reasoning, ethics (especially action theory), history of philosophy and philosophical ideas.

Setup: You can expect lecturing to provide background, context and problematisation, but active participation is required. Seminars are organized and a guest-lecturer invited so you will have access to more in-depth discussion and diverse perspectives. To make the most of the course, all literature must be prepared thoroughly in advance of every lecture. All literature and details on reading material will be available on studentportalen. You will also work with an essay during the course.
In order to meet the general entry requirements you must have successfully completed for first cycle studies and have documented skills in English. First cycle studies may include disciplines such as philosophy, law and/or political science.

Course Summary
What is law? What is its purpose? Does it consist merely of rules? Are these commands? Can anything be law? What has law to do with justice? Or morality? Or democracy? What makes a law valid? Do we have a duty to obey the law? These, and many more, philosophical questions suffuse the fabric of law – and law is rarely out of the news: while lawyers celebrate the virtues of the rule of law, reformers lament its shortcomings, and cynics question its professed correspondence to justice. Yet, they do not doubt its impact on our lives. Nor is philosophy of law restricted to mere contemplative thought: every branch of the law generates queries about its own meaning and purpose. Can the law of contract be properly understood without an appreciation of the concepts of rights and duties? How is the law of tort to be explained in the absence of economic theories of compensation? Is property law not founded on certain conceptions of ownership steeped in history? Can criminal law dispense with reasons for inflicting punishment?
This course provides an overview of leading legal theories and selected legal concepts. This entails developing the intellectual skills essential to an evaluation of the acceptability or otherwise of ideas of law, rights and justice. Since no society can properly be understood or explained without a coherent conception of its law, philosophy of law plays a decisive role in defining and defending the values and ideals that sustain your way of life.

Readings
Wacks, R., Understanding Jurisprudence. An Introduction to Legal Theory, Oxford University Press 2012. A selection of texts from the primary literature, from Austin to Alexy. A list of texts will be provided by the teacher and available at studentportalen.
More information is available here [poster] and here [syllabus]
To register please contact Rysiek Sliwinski. tel. 018-4717351; Rysiek.Sliwinski@filosofi.uu.se

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GÖTEBORG UNIVERSITY
Introduction to Medieval Philosophy , 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Ana María Mora-Márquez

Course dates: September 29 – October 3

Course description: The course intends to give a general introduction to the main philosophical discussions of medieval scholasticism. We will focus on the 13th and early 14th centuries, and will read and discuss selected passages both by masters of arts and by doctors of theology. The first session of the course will be devoted to a general introduction to the intellectual setting of the medieval University of Paris. In the following sessions we will read and discuss some texts related to i) logic and semantics; ii) philosophy of mind and epistemology; iii) metaphysics; and iv) ethics. Here follows a detailed description of each thematic part.

Students are expected to write a short essay (5000 to 8000 words including footnotes) about any of the 4 general themes introduced during the seminar.
A full description of the course is available here.

For questions about the course contact Ana María Mora-Márquez
Apply by email to Peter Johnsen

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STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
Voluntariness and responsibility in Aristotle's Nichomachean ethics 3.1 and 3.5 , 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Gösta Grönroos (Stockholm) and Erik Eliasson (Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies/Swedish Institute in Rome)
Course dates: November 10 – 14

Course descriptionChapters 3.1 and 3.5 in Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics form one of the earliest, and most influential, writings on voluntariness and responsibility in the Western philosophical tradition. Short of working on a notion of freedom to do otherwise, let alone of free will, Aristotle attempts to articulate voluntariness of action as a condition for justifiedly praising and blaming an agent. The aims of the course is to spell out Aristotle’s account in these two chapters, and to assess its strengths and weaknesses.

In 3.1, Aristotle puts forward three features that should be taken into account in articulating voluntariness as a condition for responsibility. The first is whether the agent is the origin, or the cause, of the action. The second is whether the agent knows the relevant particulars pertaining to the action, and the third whether the agent enjoys the action, having no regrets. We will probe into each of these features individually, but also into the rationale of them taken together. For instance, in what sense is the agent the cause of the action, and how is this idea related to the 3.5 view that voluntary actions are up to the agent to do or not to do? What kind of cognition is it reasonable to expect from the agent, and what kind of negligence exempts from blame? Why does the emotional response of the agent to the action matter for whether the action counts as voluntary or not? Moreover, are these three features intended as jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for voluntariness, and thus for responsibility, or are they merely aspects pertinent to the assessment? Is the voluntary the contrary to the involuntary, and what is the status of the non-voluntary? How are the so called mixed actions to be understood?

In 3.5, Aristotle goes to some length to repudiate the view that the bad person is exempt from blame, since she cannot but act basely due to her base character traits. Aristotle argues that since character is acquired through actions, all that matters is that these character forming actions are voluntary, and that the agent is aware of what Aristotle takes to be the obvious insight that character is acquired through repeated actions. The details of this argument, however, are far from clear. For instance, does Aristotle claim that a person cannot act out of character, and, hence, that a bad person is doomed to stay bad? What does it mean that the yet not bad person could have acted otherwise so as to acquire another kind of character? What does the 3.5 account add to the account of voluntariness in 3.1 in the first place?

More information is available here.

To register for the course email Gösta Grönroos.

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Philosophy of Time and Persistence, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg
Course dates: November 17 – 21

Course description
Virtually all theorizing in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities presuppose a general theoretical framework of changeable objects that exist in and persist through time. In this course we will investigate the conceptual, logical and metaphysical underpinnings of this world view. We will address issues like the following: What is time? Can there be time without change? Does time flow? Is there an arrow of time? Does the past exist? Does the future exist? What is the bearing of the special theory of relativity on these issues? How do objects persist? Do they endure, perdure or exdure through time? Can objects persist through change? Are objects three- or four-dimensional? Can persistence be vague? Can it be conventional? How do theories of persistence bear on questions about constitution?

Further information can be downloaded here: Course description and Reading List

For questions and registration contact Ylva von Gerber

 

 

Spring 2014

GÖTEBORG UNIVERSITY
Against Facts, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Arianna Betti
Course dates: April 7 - April 11
(10-12 Monday - Friday in room T116 Olof Wijksgatan 6,
14-16 Monday - Friday in room K235 Lennart Torstenssonsgatan 6).

Core areas: metaphysics, philosophy of language, semantics, (philosophy of) linguistics

Relevant areas of application: epistemology, ethics (especially action theory), methodology of the history of philosophy and philosophical ideas, science and technology studies, theoretical computer science

Setup: five-day intensive course. You can expect some lecturing to provide background and context, but active participation during meetings is a requirement. Due to the intensive character of the course, all literature must be prepared thoroughly before the course starts. You will have no time to do the reading during the course.

Course Summary
Facts are ubiquitous in analytic philosophy. They are also much debated. However, the debate is often confined to a very specialised area of investigation, and framed by strong tacit assumptions. Frequently the debate proves unclear in one or more of these four areas: concerning which notions of fact are at issue; how they relate to cognate notions (situations, states of affairs, Fregean propositions, Russellian propositions, substances, thick particulars, tropes, events, relations, mereological complexes, etc.); why we need facts (if at all); and, from a more general methodological point of view, what sorts of arguments there are for acknowledging facts, especially those based on the workings of natural language, and on what grounds any such argument may be considered effective. This course is meant for advanced students to get a clear grip on the state of affairs of the research in these four areas at once.

Philosophers defend roughly two kinds of facts – compositional or concrete facts, and propositional or abstract facts – and argue for them in completely different ways. Compositional facts are argued for on the basis of Armstrong’s truthmaker argument; propositional facts are argued for on the basis of some argument relying on the occurrence of expressions such as ‘(the) fact (that p)’ in natural language. The methodology of the former kind of argument relies on abductive reasoning, or argumentation to the best explanation. The methodology of the latter kind of argument relies on a modified, Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment applied to natural language (I call it ‘the argument from nominal reference’).

In this course we will draw on areas of metaphysics, philosophy of language and linguistics in order to evaluate both kinds of arguments, with special attention to their methodological presuppositions. The background for the course will be provided by my forthcoming book Against Facts (MIT Press, 2014), where I argue that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalogue of the world, at least not as they are described by the major metaphysical theories of facts known to us. Additional readings will include works by Fine, Künne, Maurin, and Moltmann.

More information is available here.

To register send an e-mail to Peter Johnsen.

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Reasons, propositional attitudes, and value, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Andrew Reisner
Course dates: February 10 - February 14

Course Summary
In recent years, what is commonly called the ‘fitting attitude’ analysis of final value (FA) has gained considerable popularity amongst philosophers working in value theory and metaethics. FA is the view that what is for x to be good, or finally valuable, is for x to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude (or perhaps for there to be reasons to have a pro-attitude towards x). Using FA as a point of departure, this course examines a series of questions about the nature of value and the nature of normative reasons for propositional attitudes. In particular, we shall be examining the extent to which two kinds of objections to FA raise much farther reaching worries for other theories of value and normative reasons.

The first kind of objection seeks to sever the link between reasons for pro-attitudes and value by offering examples in which something is not good, but nonetheless there are reasons to have a pro-attitude towards it. This objection is commonly known as a ‘the wrong kind of reason’ problem (WKR). WKR has been discussed extensively in the literature. We shall be focusing in particular on difficulties with understanding normative reasons for propositional attitudes in a way that could be useful for responding to WKR. These difficulties affect a wider class of views about normative reasons for propositional attitudes, and the relationship between those views and FA will be explored.

The second kind of objection seeks to sever the link between reasons for pro-attitudes and value by offering examples in which something is good, but nonetheless there are no reasons to have a pro-attitude towards it. This objection may be called ‘the wrong kind of value’ problem (WKV). We shall be considering difficulties raised for FA by WKV that also touch on a much broader class of metaethical theories, notably those with ideal advisors or most rational self views. Here again, we explore the relationship between some of these views and FA.

For further information, readings and schedule see this document.

To register for the course e-mail Eric Brandestedt

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UMEÅ UNIVERSITY
Disagreement, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Gunnar Björnsson and Timothy Sundell
Course dates: May 19 - May 23

Course summary (download as PDF)
Disagreement plays a central but potentially puzzling role in philosophical discussion. On the one hand, disagreement that seemingly is fundamental or faultless can underwrite arguments for various forms of non-cognitivism, contextualism, or relativism in philosophy of science, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics. Such disagreement, many have thought, is best explained on the assumption that there are no objectively correct answers in the domains in question, or, perhaps, that the meanings of the relevant terms are variable and in some way sensitive to the context in which they are used or even assessed. On the other hand, the very possibility of disagreement in these domains has on other occasions formed the basis for serious objections to each of these views. Arguments for various forms of absolutist cognitivism, for example, appeal to the fact that people with fundamentally differing views seem genuinely to disagree, suggesting that the disagreeing parties are concerned with the same aspects of objective reality.

The discussion of disagreement emerges as an important part of 20th century metaethics, starting with C. L. Stevenson’s suggestion that moral disagreement should be understood as disagreement in prescription or non-cognitive attitude rather than disagreement about facts, an idea developed further in the work of R.M. Hare, Simon Blackburn, and Allan Gibbard. During the last decade, the discussion has gained new depth in the context of debates between contextualists, relativists, and expressivists about predicates of taste, epistemic modals, indicative conditionals, and other expressions. In work by John MacFarlane, Andy Egan, Tamina Stephenson and others, this literature has seen the development of new ways of understanding relativistic positions, while in work by Kai von Fintel, Thony Gillies, Janice Dowell, Stephen Finley, David Plunkett, and the organizers, among others, it has given rise to new pragmatic explanations of disagreement phenomena.

The course Disagreement aims to provide both an overview of the role that arguments from disagreement have played in the philosophical debate and an understanding of a variety of contemporary accounts of disagreement and how they matter for the relevance of disagreement phenomena in philosophical arguments.

Readings
Papers and book excerpts by, among others, C. L. Stevenson, R. M. Hare, A. J. Ayer, J. L. Mackie, R. Boyd, T. Horgan, M. Timmons, L. Schroeter, F. Schroeter, M. Ridge, J. MacFarlane, A. Egan, J. Hawthorne, B. Weatherson, K. von Fintel & A. S. Gillies, J. Dowell, G. Björnsson, S. Finlay, D. Plunkett & T. Sundell, J. Dreier, and E. Hirsch

Examination: Course paper

Teachers: Timothy Sundell, University of Kentucky, and Gunnar Björnsson, Umeå University have done extensive research on disagreement phenomena and have recent or forthcoming papers on the topic in Ethics, Mind, Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophical Studies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Legal Theory, and Journal of Ethics.

To register for the course, contact Jonas Nilsson

For questions about the course, contact Gunnar Björnsson

 

Fall 2013

STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
Future generations, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturers: Krister Bykvist and Gustaf Arrhenius
Course dates: November 18–22

Course Summary

This course covers questions and problems concerning our moral duties to future generations. For the last decades there has been a search underway for a theory that can accommodate our intuitions in regard to moral duties to future generations. The object of this search has proved surprisingly elusive. The classical moral theories in the literature all have perplexing implications in this area. Classical Utilitarianism, for instance, implies that it could be better to expand a population even if everyone in the resulting population would be much worse off than in the original.

The main problem has been to find an adequate population theory, that is, a theory about the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may vary. Since, arguably, any reasonable moral theory has to take these aspects of possible states of affairs into account when determining the normative status of actions, the study of population ethics is of general import for moral theory.

A number of population theories have been proposed in the literature that purport to avoid counterintuitive implications such as the one mentioned above. The suggestions are diverse: introducing novel ways of aggregating welfare into a measure of value, revising the notion of a life worth living, questioning the way we can compare and measure welfare, counting people’s welfare differently depending on the temporal location or the modal features of their lives, and challenging the logic of axiological and normative concepts. We shall investigate the concepts and assumptions involved in these theories as well as their implications for population ethics. We shall discuss a number of intuitively appealing adequacy conditions for an acceptable population theory. Finally, we consider whether it is possible to find a theory that satisfies a number of such conditions by considering a number of so-called impossibility theorems.

The course has the form of a series of seminars and each student is expected to actively participate in discussions and presentation of texts. The course will be given in English.

 

For more information see the course website. To register contact Kjell Svensson.

 

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UMEÅ UNIVERSITY
Philosophical Methodology and the Role of Intutions, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Herman Cappelen (University of St. Andrews)
Course dates: November 25th to November 29th, 2013 4 hours per day

Course Summary

Recent debates about meta-philosophy have focused on the role of intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories. The enormously influential experimental philosophy movement has criticised analytic philosophers' (alleged) extensive reliance on intuitions. They claim their experimental results show that intuition based philosophy has a corrupt and unreliable foundation. In my book Philosophy without Intuitions I respond to this line of criticism by arguing that it is false that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Philosophers have engaged in excessive and unnecessary use of 'intuition' vocabulary, but they have not done anything that can be reasonably described as 'relying on intuitions as evidence'. This course will explore these issues (and in particular the arguments in Philosophy without Intuitions) and responses to those arguments from, among others, John Bengson, Paul Boghossian, David Chalmers, Brian Weatherson, and Jonathan Weinberg.

Core readings
Cappelen: Philosophy without Intuitions
Williamson: The Philosophy of Philosophy
Bengson: ”How Philosophers use Intuition and ‘Intuition’”
Weatherson: ”Centrality and Marginalization”
Weinberg: ”Cappelen Between a Rock and a Hard Place”
(A list of supplementary readings will be provided during the course)

For further information and registration, contact Jonas Nilsson

A schedule and further information will be made available here.

 

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Libertarianism, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Marcus Agnafors
Course dates: October 28 - November 1

Course Summary

Libertarianism is frequently accused of being a cold-hearted and egoistic theory, putting property rights and the absence of interference before solidarity and duties of assistance. Only a minority (9.9 %; see http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl) of philosophers are libertarians. Nevertheless, it has retained a strong intuitive appeal and continues to be a constant contender in the debates within moral and political philosophy. Recently, libertarianism has seen a considerable revival, both in politics and within political philosophy.
In particular, the group of theories labelled as left-libertarianism have recently been given increasing attention within the scholarly debate. This branch of libertarianism is often associated with philosophers such as Hillel Steiner, Michael Otsuka, Peter Vallentyne, and Phillipe van Parijs. Left-libertarianism, depending on definition, typically include some “leftist” component, and is often contrasted with right-libertarian theories. Right-libertarianism, showing little interest in notions like solidarity and equality while placing great emphasis on individual rights and private property, have been expounded by numerous writers, among them Robert Nozick, Ayn Rand, Friedrich Hayek, Walter Block, Murray Rothbard, Jan Narveson, Eric Mack, and Tibor Machan. In real-world politics, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the interest in libertarianism, and in particular its right-wing versions focusing on economics, skyrocketed (as did the interest in Marxism). Several influential American politicians have recently confessed libertarian leanings (such as Ron Paul and Rand Paul).
Recognising the philosophical and political significance of libertarianism as a theory, the aim of the course is to make the students familiar with the diverse political-philosophical family of theories known as libertarianism. This involves studying the historical roots of libertarianism as well as its modern versions. Libertarianism will be examined in both of its main versions; right- and left libertarianism. During the course, libertarianism’s relation to classical and contemporary liberalism will be discussed, as well as its relation to Marxism and communitarian theory. Moreover, a further aim of the course is that the students, after having completed the course, will be able to interpret current political events and policies through a libertarian perspective.

More information about the course can be downloaded here.

For questions concerning registration and practicalities, please contact Ylva von Gerber.
If you have questions regarding the content of the course, please contact Marcus Agnafors: marcus(dot)agnafors(at)fil(dot)lu(dot)se

Spring 2013

LUND UNIVERSITY
What is a theory of justice and (Rawls') "A theory of Justice" about?
Lecturer: Joseph Almog (UCLA)
Course dates: 4-8 February

Course description:

The question I pursue is what is a theory of Justice a theory of? I pursue it both "abstractly"--in terms of what is the intended subject matter--and in terms of a famous/paradigm example, John Rawls' project as laid out in "A theory of Justice" and subsequent amplifications.

On the abstract level, I compare two methodologies of pursuing a subject matter--constructive("definitional") vs. descriptive; I also call them with an eye to a familiar technical distinction "model theoreric account" vs. "absolute-nature account". In the former case, we are interested in "constructing" the subject matter by laying down a set of principles ("axioms") and from then on we investigate the models of those principles; we thereby "construct" the subject matter as whatever is satisfies the principles, whatever is valid in the models. In the alternate methodology, we start with given intuitions about the absolute nature of the given notion/phenomenon and describe (not: define) whatever fundamental truths we isolate as made true by that prior nature.

I will discuss three familiar cases of such a methodological contrast: the theory of sets, the theory of ("metaphysical") necessity and the theory of reference. In all three cases, the constructional/definitional/model theoretic account will be seen to diverge greatly and deeply from the absolute nature description.

In the case of justice, I plan to turn Rawls's book into our case study. In its first part a model theoretic mechanism is laid down starting with "Rawls' famous "original position" but also in the manner of justifying principles(axioms). In the third part of his book, on my reading, Rawls is starts elsewhere, with the nature of justice.

The discussion connects with examinations of Rawls' intent(and achievements) by Nozick, Sen and Nagel. On top of such critiques, I will be interested in understanding the "source" of justice, whether it lays in some (contracted) institution or whether it has a natural historical basis and is prior to the state (polis,etc.) with those subsequent "artifacts" regarded as necessary byproducts of the natural historical justice-generating processes. Again, a comparison with be made with the "source" of truths about sets, about necessity and about the way ee refer in language. All in all, I will try to argue that Rawls himself was somewhat dual in between the two methodologies, as (non surprisingly) were (respectively) Zermelo, Kripke and Frege in the other cases.

A longer description can be downloaded here (pdf).

To register for the course contact Ylva von Gerber

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STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
The Ethics of Killing, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Torbjörn Tännsjö
Course dates: 8-12 April

Course description:
In the course we ponder when it is wrong to kill and — when it is wrong — why it is wrong.

Literature:
Torbjörn Tännsjö, Manuscript, Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder?
Other readings will be announced.

To register for the course e-mail info@philosopy.su.se

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STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
Selected Topics in Theoretical Reason, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Andrew Reisner
Course dates: 27-31 May

Course description:This seminar examines selected topics in the field of theoretical reason, which concerns the norms of belief and belief-like mental states. We will spend the first part of the seminar looking at some theories of belief. In particular, we will be considering whether all-out beliefs are best understood as being high-confidence credences (Lockeanism) or as being independent from credential states. We will then look at the two main philosophical motivations for strict evidentialism, the view that all normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. Arguments against evidentialism will also be considered in some detail. Finally, we will look at the connection between direct doxastic voluntarism and possible kinds of normative reasons for belief.
The design of the seminar is such so as to give a coherent overview of the way in which views about how beliefs function connect to views about what kind of normative reasons for belief there are. A central theme will be to examine what role, if any, considerations arising from the goodness of having particular beliefs have in providing reasons for those beliefs.

 

To register for the course e-mail info@philosopy.su.se

 

Fall 2012

STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
Framtida generationer (Future generations), 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Gustaf Arrhenius
Course dates: Twice a week between Oct 8 and Nov 1

Course description (The default language is Swedish but the course will be given in English if any non-swedish speaking student register).

This course covers questions and problems concerning future generations. The course has the form of a seminar and each student is expected to take active parti in discussions and presetation of texts.

Literature
Arrhenius, G: Future Generations
Parfit, D: Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press 1984), part 4
Additional readings may be provided by the lecturer.

Course website

More information is available here.
Register here.

STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
The semantics of proper names, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Kathrin Glüer-Pagin
Course dates: Wednesdays between Oct 24 and Dec 12

Course description

Proper names have always fascinated philosophers of language. Are they mere tags or labels? Or do they have descriptive content? If the former, why is it that a sentence like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' seems informative? And if the latter, why is it that a sentence like 'Aristotle might not have been a philosopher' seems true? The course starts with a quick historical overview, but its focus will be on recent work on the semantics of proper names.

Readings:
A detailed list of readings will be provided later, but familiarity with the following will be assumed:

Frege, Gottlob: On Sense and Reference
Russell, Bertrand: On Denoting
Kripke, Saul: Naming and Necessity

More information is available here.
To register send an email to info@philosophy.su.se

STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
Mereology and Modality, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Paul Needham
Course dates: Fridays between Nov 2 and Dec 14

Course description

The central theme of the course is the application of mereology in the articulation and development of the three-dimensional view of material objects (the continuants of Johnson’s continuants and occurrents—Johnson (1921, pp. 199-202), Fine (2006)), as opposed to the four-dimensional view developed by, for example, Sider (2001) and Hawley (2002). The emphasis will be positive, on the development of the conception of continuants, rather than negative, on the critique of the four- dimensional view. It will involve distinguishing matter as the essentially permanent stuff treated in chemistry as being of various substance kinds in various forms of aggregation, from the transient individuals which are constituted of matter, usually different matter at different times. I will be drawing on material presented in recent publications of mine (Needham 1981, 1999, 2000, 2007, 2010a and b).

A detailed course description with reading list can be downloaded here.

More information is available here.
To register send an email to info@philosophy.su.se

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UMEÅ UNIVERSITY
Universality,the Universe and Reverse Metaphysics, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Joseph Almog (UCLA)
Course dates: Nov 12-16 (4 hours per day)

Course description

Our focus in the lectures will be three questions corresponding to the three phrases in the title.
The first question is about truth and its makers: what makes-true an absolutely universal truth?  Do we make in-eliminable reference to the (as philosophers would say “de-re”) nature of this one primal object, the universe, bearing some property P by that nature, or can we rid ourselves off this dark primal unity, perhaps deny that such a thing exist at all, and speak of the manifold or plurality or class or set of all the ordinary objects—like you and me and the lamppost-- making each, individually, some translate dictum “P*” true?

The second question is about that kind of dark object: is there such a unity-object as the physical universe? Is there such a unity-object as the universe of sets (ordinals)? Finally, if the answer to both is “yes”, are they one and the same object-universe?

The third question is about method. Ever since the Hume-Kant critique of metaphysics, we practice what may be called metaphysics within the bounds of epistemology—we explain the nature of objects—and not least the universe “as a whole”, if object it is—within the bounds of our concepts; we proceed from concept (or: universals) to universe. Our third question is: what picture—of both metaphysics and our understanding of the world—would emerge if we reversed course and practiced epistemology-and more critical now than epistemology, understanding—within the bounds of metaphysics, proceeding now from the universe and its “own” objects to our understanding there-of?

The lectures and seminars will take place over five days. In the morning of each day, there will be a lecture and discussion. In the afternoon, there will be short student presentations and further discussion.  The assessment will be based on participation and a take home examination, which is due in the beginning of January 2013

Download course description including a reading list here.
A schedule will be made available here.

For further information and registration contact Jonas Nilsson

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Analytical Marxism
– Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Marcus Agnafors
Course dates: Oct 8-12

Course description
In popular mind, Marx was an old thinker just about to be swept under the rug, proven as wrong as anyone can be. But following the 2008 Financial Crisis, attention was once again directed toward the theories grounded in the works of Karl Marx as capitalism was said to have shown to be something else than the miraculous system it was alleged to be. The interest in Marx’ theory skyrocketed (as did the interest in the very opposite camp, of course; such as in Ayn Rand and in the Austrian School of Economics).
 
In philosophy however, Marx’ ideas have maintained a fairly steady presence. During the 80’s, a philosophical group calling their work “Analytical Marxism” gained a reputation for discussing and improving Marx’ theories using the tools of analytical philosophy. Among the people active in the group were, in addition to its founder G. A.
Cohen, now well-known scholars such as Jon Elster, Philippe van Parijs, Erik Olin-Wright, Hillel Steiner and John Roemer. All of them have later had an enormous influence, in philosophy as well as in sociology and economics.
 
The aim of this course is threefold: First, it aims to provide the students with some basic knowledge of Marxist theory. This will involve becoming acquainted with some
of Marx’ writings and his terminology. Second, the course’s main goal is to make the students familiar with the works associated with Analytical Marxism and some of the subsequent works of the members of the group. This will also involve studying some of the criticism directed against it. Third, the goal is that the students will, after having taken the course, be able to recognise both classic Marxist ideas and modern Analytical Marxist ideas in current state of affairs and political developments relevant to the overall topic.
 
The course is suitable both for students already familiar with the field of political philosophy and for newcomers. Basic familiarity with the main theories in the field of political philosophy and/or ethics is preferable, but not required.

Full description can be downloaded here.

 

To register, send an email to Ylva von Gerber

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Reasoning, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Frank Zenker e-mail
Course dates: Dec 10-14 (10-12 am and 2-4 pm)

Course description
The study of reasoning—deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible, cross cultural, conversational, argumentative—is a major focus of investigation in both psychology and philosophy. Next to more traditional issues arising from the rationality debate, this includes a focus on fallacious reasoning and its reduction through education, the development of pragmatics, and the study of human reasoning process through neuro-imaging techniques.

Aim: The aim of this course is to enable learners to orient themselves in this research area (which may reasonably be called interdisciplinary) to the extent that they can actively participate in current empirical research and discourse on this matter.
We will work through select parts of a recently compiled selection of “classics” from a reader by Adler and Rips (2008). The three major themes are: 1. Foundations of Reasoning (Philosophical Viewpoints; Fallacies and Rationality), 2. Modes of Reasoning (Deductive Reasoning; Induction; Dual and Integrative Approaches; Abduction and Belief change; Causal and Counterfactual Reasoning; Argumentation); 3. Interactions of Reasoning in Human Thought (Reasoning and Pragmatics; domain-specific, Goal Based, and Evolutionary Approaches; Reasoning and Cultures; Biology, Emotions, and Reasoning).

Workload/Grading: Successful completion requires reading 20 to 30 pages per meeting, and the preparation and delivery of a max. 30 minute group presentation on one of the above subthemes (the presentation requires additional reading of ca. 60-90 pages). Learners are expected to focus on at least one of the above subthemes (see the table of content under the link below).
Grading occurs on the basis of presentation, an intermediate quiz, peer feedback, and a final paper (of 10-15 pages) due within 2 months after the end of the course.

Prerequisites: A background in mathematics or logic may be found helpful for some (but not all) subthemes. Learners with a background in the empirical sciences are especially welcome. A background in philosophy is not necessary to successfully conclude the course. Those interested in pursuing empirical work are assumed to have a background in empirical research methodology (which is not provided in this course). The course is open to students at Master’s level and up. The language of instruction is English.

Reference
Adler, J.E., and Rips, L.J. (2008). Reasoning. Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (will be made available).
http://www.amazon.com/Reasoning-Studies-Human-Inference-Foundations/dp/0521848156

To register, send an email to Ylva von Gerber

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Externalist Epistemology: Problems of Reliabilism, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Prof. Erik J. Olsson
Course dates: Oct 22-26

The course will discuss externalism and internalism in epistemology generally, and focus on long-standing problems for reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification, including the generality, value and Gettier problems, as well as the evil demon and clairvoyance examples. Some question that we will consider include: How should processes of belief formation be classified given that the classification may determine the reliability of the process? How can an externalist theory of knowledge explain the distinctive value of knowledge in the light of the presumed fact that reliable belief acquisition is of mere indicative value with regard to truth? Are internalist and externalist theories competing theories of knowledge or are they rather addressing different things?

We will consider reliabilist proposals for how these and other problems can be addressed, their possible advantages and disadvantages. Special attention will be paid to the methodological assumptions behind the debate, especially the contrast between mainstream methodology and Carnap’s method of explication. We will also attend to other externalist theories, such as tracking and safety theories. An issue will be how these other theories fare in comparison with reliabilism.

The course will be based on classical and recent articles in the field by Alvin I. Goldman and others. The course literature list can be found here [insert link to course literature]. Further reading includes material from a book manuscript written by the lecturer and Martin L. Jönsson. The course can, as usual, be credited as a Master or Doctoral course. Examination requires active participation, short presentation of an article from the course literature, and the writing of an exam paper on a subject of relevance to the course.

A list of course literature is available here.

To register, send an email to studievagledare@fil.lu.se

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Spring 2012

STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
Some Challenges of Contemporary Epistemology, 7,5 hp
Lecturer: Levi Spectre
Course dates: March 19-23

The aim of the course is to learn and discuss some of the debates and problems of contemporary epistemology on an advanced level. Although the pace of the course will be rapid, the attempt is to consider each topic thoroughly, to try and discuss the subjects on the level of discussion in current literature. Rather than considering the epistemological problems as deriving from epistemic "isms" such as coherentism, foundationalism, epistemic externalism and internalism, dogmatism, contextualism and invariantism, the focus of the course will be on the principles governing knowledge, rational belief and justification.

More details will be added soon.
To register, send an email to info@philosophy.su.se

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UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
Indeterminacy
Lecturer: Patrick Greenough
Course dates: April 16–20
 

Schedule:

Monday April 16	10-12 Eng2-K1072	and	14-16 Eng2-K1072
Tuesday April 17	10-12 Eng2-K1023	and	14-16 Eng2-K1072
Wednesday April 18	10-12 Eng2-K1072	and	14-16 Eng2-K1072
Thursday April 19	10-12 Eng2-0023	and	14-16 Eng2-K1072
Friday April 20	10-12 Eng2-K1072	and	14-16 Eng2-K1072

About the Course
Incomplete definitions, partial identity, vagueness, phenomenal predication, the liar paradox, the semantic paradoxes in general, the truth-teller paradoxes, presupposition failure, reference failure, evaluative discourse, fictional incompleteness, category mistakes, incommensurability, translation, reference, rule following, irresolvable disagreements, quantum states, and the open future-- -all these phenomena give rise to indeterminacy in one form or another.
But does the existence of indeterminacy, in some form of other, entail that we must revise classical semantics and/or classical logic? Are we better off with an epistemic or a non-epistemic conception of indeterminacy? Does the existence of genuine indeterminacy enforce any kind of anti-realism? Do some forms of indeterminacy (such as vagueness or higher-order vagueness) entail that there is no logic of natural language? Since there seems to be more than one species of indeterminacy does this entail that we must posit more than one logic of natural language? If yes, what form would such a pluralism take? Can we be pluralists about indeterminacy but monists about logic? Is the world itself indeterminate and does this entail the indeterminacy of identity? Does all genuine indeterminacy issue merely from certain features of language? Can we make sense of indeterminacy from within a deflationary conception of truth? Is indeterminacy broadly a species of incompleteness (of information or of fact) or is it a species of overdetermination (of information or of fact)?
In this course we will pose and endeavour to answer all these questions.

For registration contact Rysiek Sliwinski

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UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
Kant on Love and Respect
Lecturer: Ina Goy
Course dates: May 28–June 1

Download detailed course-description and schedule here.

About the Course
This colloquium aims at investigating Kant’s account of moral psychology, especially the feelings of respect and love in the Groundwork, Kant’s second Critique, and the Doctrine of Virtue. Beside the historical background and the development of a theory of moral feeling in Kant’s writings, we will examine fundamental systematic features of respect and love in Kant’s approach: we will discuss their status as a priori principles (as opposed to empirical principles) and investigate their emotional nature as feelings. We will study the ethical functions of respect and love, and determine their relationship to each other, to the practical law, and to moral duties.
The colloquium takes place from Monday, May 28, 2012, until Thursday, May 31, 2012, daily from 10–12 am, 2–6 pm, at Uppsala Universitet, Engelska Parken, Humanistiskt Centrum, Thunbergsvägen 3H, Uppsala. Course materials should be prepared in advance. Credit points are available on graduate level, however, all undergraduates, doctoral students, and academic colleagues are welcome to participate. Students who wish to qualify for credit points must participate in a final exam on Friday, June 1, 10–12 am.

Pre-registration is recommended. Please contact: Dr. Ina Goy and Dr. Marcel Quarfood

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UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
Semantic Program of Expressivism
Lecturer: Kent Hurtig
Course dates: June 11–15

Schedule:

Monday June 11	10-12 and 14-16	Eng2-1022
Tuesday June 12	10-12 and 14-16	Eng2-1022
Wednesday June 13	10-12 and 14-16	Eng2-1022
Thursday June 14	10-12 and 14-16	Eng2-1022
Friday June 15	10-12 and 14-16	Eng2-1022

Course book
Schroeder, Max, Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism, Oxford University Press. 2008.

About the Course
Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy. Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. Expressivists have not yet even managed to solve the 'negation problem' - to explain why atomic normative sentences are inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from clear that expressivism even could be true.

[Schroeder's] book evaluates the semantic commitments of expressivism by showing how an expressivist semantics would work, what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understanding of the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful, constructive expressivist semantics, which solves many of what have been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism, including making unprecedented progress in attacking the well-known Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivist theories. But it also argues that any account which can attain these advantages will face further, even more formidable, obstacles. Expressivism, it is argued, is coherent and interesting, but false.

For registration contact Rysiek Sliwinski

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Philosophy and Computation, 7,5 ECTS
Lecturer: Paula Quinon
Course dates: May 7-11
 

Course summary (A new syllabus can be downloaded here)
The course has as its objective to familiarize Master and PhD students with a variety of topics related to problems of philosophy and computation.

Although the topical approach of the course will be problem-based, the course will start with an account of a historical events. It is because of the important anniversary being celebrated this year. Hundred years ago, June 23rd, 1912, was born Alan Turing, one of the main figures in theory of computation. For this reason in 2012 many events are organized to celebrate Turing’s life and scientific impact. The course is one such event and hence the two first days will be devoted to presenting Turing’s life and work. Students will learn about Turing machines, the halting problem, Turing test, codes and cryptanalysis. This will be but in perspective to Turing’s life (King’s College in Cambridge, Bletchley Park).

The knowledge issued from studying Turing’s work will lead us to more contemporary questions related to both:

- the philosophy of computation and
- the use of computations for philosophical purposes.

Within the topics related to philosophy of computation, an important place will be held by the discussion of problems related to the Church-Turing thesis or the question of what an algorithm is. We are also going to address the issues of the new emerging branch of philosophy: philosophy of computer sciences.
As for the topics related to the use of computational tools in philosophy, students will be introduced to the questions related to computational theory of mind, use of computational constraints on human understanding, in particular those related to numerical cognition and complexity of quantifiers.

To register, send an email to Ylva von Gerber

 

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Fall 2011

STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
Expressivism: meaning as the expression of mental states, 7,5 hp
Lecturer: Arvid Båve
Course dates: October 10–14

Expressivism is the view that the meaning of some—or, indeed, all—expressions consists in their being used to express certain mental states. In this course, we will study and discuss the early emotivist origins of this idea, some examples of more sophistaced versions of expressivism about normative language, the problem of defining "expression", the Frege-Geach argument, subsequent applications to epistemic modals and conditionals, and finally the generalised version of expressivism as a theory of all linguistic meaning.

For detailed information and schedule see here.

For questions on the contents of the course, please contact Arvid Båve.
To register, send an email to info@philosophy.su.se

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Rationality, Logic and Reasoning, 7,5 hp
Lecturer: Emmanuel Genot
Course dates: November 14–18

In the last half of the 20th century, the idea of logic as a norm of reasoning has fallen into disrepute. The widely held view among psychologists is that humans are poor logical reasoners. However, the underlying picture of logic often reduces to truth tables and syllogisms, ignorant of most of the changes formal semantics has undergone in the same period.
The course will review the arguments against logicality of reasoning based on empirical evidence, and discuss their strength. Their conclusions will be critically examined in the light of more up-to-date semantic theories of logic. We will attempt to determine the extend to which this debate can compel us, as philosophers, to change our view on rationality.
 
After a general introduction to the current debate, the course will be primarily problem-oriented. Concrete cases from experimental studies will be discussed, introducing technical background, when necessary. We however presuppose a familiarity with basic first-order logic, and students are encouraged to try themselves against some logical puzzles.
One of the aim of the course is to familiarize philosophers with non-philosophical literature, yet philosophically relevant, especially in cognitive psychology, linguistics, and game theory. Because of this interdisciplinary background, it is open to students in practical and theoretical philosophy, with interests in cognitive science, and linguistics.
 

For questions on the contents of the course, please contact Emmanuel Genot.
To register, send an email to Ylva von Gerber

A more detailed description of the course can be downloaded here.

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LUND UNIVERSITY
Collective Agency & Collective Responsibility
Lecturer: András Szigeti
Course dates: November 21–25

The course offers an in-depth survey of the related topics of collective agency and collective responsibility.
The interest in collectives has two main sources. First, there is a theoretical motivation. Thinking about groups helps us to get clearer about some central issues in action theory and social ontology. Under what conditions can human beings be said to constitute a group? What is it for individuals to act jointly? Are there truly collective agents, and if yes, do they resemble natural persons?
Second, there is the ethical motivation. Associations of people are potential sources of harm and benefit to others. In late modernity, it has become clearer than ever that the existence of collectives can crucially impact on human lives. In particular, many worry that without a robust notion of collective agency and collective responsibility such harms will remain unaccounted for.
The course will pursue both of these dimensions addressing theoretical issues as well as some first-order moral concerns. We will also touch on some interdisciplinary connections to evolutionary anthropology and psychology of human sociality, on the one hand, and to social choice theory, on the other.

For questions or registration, send an email to Ylva von Gerber

A more detailed description of the course including schedule can be downloaded here.

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UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
Kinds of Reasons
Lecturer: Kent Hurtig
Course dates: October 3–6 & 10–13

Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. In Kinds of Reasons, maria Alvares offers a fresh and incisive treatment of this subject, focusing on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Building on some important recent work in the area, and drawing on the writtings of G.E.M. Anscome, Alvarez’s arguments run counter to the orthodoxy that has dominated the theory of action for the past forty years. Bold, painstaking, lucid, and direct, Kinds of Reasons stakes out a distinctive position in one of the most hotly contested areas of contemporary philosophy.

For questions on the contents of the course, please contact Kent Hurtig.
To register, send an email to Rysiek Sliwinski

A more detailed description of the course including a schedule here.

 

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UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
The Idea of a University
Lecturer: Sharon Rider
Course dates: November 14–18

The course will take the form of seminars, with short introductory lectures by the instructor. In the event of scheduling conflicts with other courses, notify the instructor. While participation in the seminars is expected, arrangements can be made if the student cannot attend every one.
The aim of the course is to provide the student with the occasion to reflect critically and systematically upon his own assumptions, norms and values and even, or perhaps especially, his or her prior intellectual training, by placing current prevalent notions concerning study, science and scholarship in a broader historical, social and epistemological context. The emphasis of the course is not, however, historical or sociological. Rather, we will concentrate on certain conceptual questions and problems associated with the idea of a university and its development, i.e. with the meaning of and relationship between such diverse notions as “research”, “scholarship”, “higher education”, “culture”, “critical thinking”, “scientific training”,  “professional judgment”, Bildung, etc., especially with regard to the place of the university in a geopolitical and economic context.
The primary “expected outcome” of the course is that the student will have improved his or her capacity to formulate, analyze and reason independently about a concrete problem about the nature of knowledge production and science in all its complexity while retaining and developing focus and clarity. Because the course assumes prior acquaintance with academic study at a reasonably high level, it is open only to students registered at the MA- or PhD-level.

For questions on the contents of the course, please contact Sharon Rider.
To register, send an email to Rysiek Sliwinski

A more detailed description of the course including schedule and reading assignments can be downloaded here.

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UMEÅ UNIVERSITY
Philosophy of Perception
Lecturer: Fiona McPherson, University of Glasgow
Course dates: October 24–28

A philosophical theory of perception should explain the nature of the mental states that occur during perceptual processes, and account for how perception can lead to knowledge or justified belief. The course will look at philosophical theories of perception and perceptual experience such as sense-datum, doxastic, representationalist, causal and disjunctivist theories. A particular topic that will be studied is perceptual representation. For example, we will consider whether experiences have content, and, if so, what the admissible contents are, and whether the content is conceptual or non-conceptual. The focus of the course will be on whether these theories provide a suitable account of phenomenology and epistemology.  Modern philosophy of psychology is also informed by contemporary scientific study of the brain and of behaviour therefore this course will introduce students to relevant empirical results that have a bearing on philosophical issues.

Schedule:
10-12 and 13-15, from Monday October 24 to Friday October 28

Reading list and a detailed description of the course is available here.

For application and information, please contact Jonas Nilsson

 

 

Spring 2011

Fall 2010

Spring 2010

Fall 2009